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INTRODUCTION

History, someone once said, is "an argument without an end."' Supreme
Court opinions on the Fourth Amendment2 suggest that some of the Justices
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I would like to thank Amanda
Metts and Lisa Dickstein for their research assistance. I also thank Karen Tosh for her
comments and suggestions.
1 WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF QUOTABLE DEFINITIONs

259 (Eugene E.

Brussell ed., 2d ed. 1988) (quoting Pieter Geyl).
2 The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
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secretly wish that the argument had never begun. Why concern oneself with
history when the issue is whether a Memphis, Tennessee police officer acted
reasonably in shooting Edward Garner, a skinny and unarmed 15-year-old
black kid, in the back of the head because Garner fled the scene of a suspected house burglary? 3 Why comb through historical records when the issue is whether the police must identify themselves before breaking down
doors to execute narcotics search warrants in high-crime neighborhoods? 4 In
order to answer these questions, and to understand what the Fourth Amendment means today, one has to understand the meaning history impressed
upon the Amendment in 1791.
Such high stake controversies may cause the Court to question the relevance of history to its modern Fourth Amendment rulings. 5 Still, the temptation to resort to historical arguments is hard to resist. After all, the liberty
secured by the Fourth Amendment-the right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure-is a "made in America" freedom, having it origins in the
American colonists' battle against heavy-handed British law enforcement
6
methods.
Although the Fourth Amendment had its genesis in the era of the Founding Fathers, the Supreme Court has not been consistent in juxtaposing the
history of the Amendment with modem law enforcement techniques. In one
case, history provides the driving force behind a ruling; 7 in another, it is neagainst unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1985) (discussing the common law rule
that allowed the use of whatever force was necessary to effect the arrest of a fleeing
felon-though not a misdemeanant-and concluding that because of sweeping change in the
legal and technological context, reliance on the common law rule would be a mistaken literalism that ignores the purpose of a historical inquiry).
4 See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-36 (1995) (discussing the history of the
"knock and announce" rule and holding that in some circumstances an officer's unannounced entry into a home might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
5 See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv.
820, 844 (1994) (arguing that "the Fourth Amendment's general command of
'reasonableness' must be read in light of changing circumstances").
6 See JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19 (1966)
("[Tlhe Fourth Amendment provides us with a rich historical background rooted in
American, as well as English, experience; it is the one procedural safeguard in the Constitution that grew directly out of the events which immediately preceded the revolutionary
struggle with England.").
7 See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931-37. In Wilson, the issue was whether the common law
"knock and announce" rule, which requires officers to identify their authority and purpose

before forcibly entering a home, "forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
inquiry." Id. at 930. Discussion of the historical pedigree of the knock and announce requirement dominated the Court's opinion. See id. at 931-37. The Court held that the
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glected even though the challenged police conduct is contrary to historical
practice. 8 In yet other cases, the meaning and weight of historical precedent
sharply divide the Court, 9 leaving readers to wonder why the Court invokes
historic rules when modem realities might govern the interactions between
the police and the citizenry. 1 0
The Court's ambivalence about the relevance of history matches its vacillation over the meaning and implications of the two clauses contained in the
Fourth Amendment's text." The Court has adopted two contrasting models
for interpreting the text. One model explains that the clauses are independent
of each other; the second model instructs that the clauses are interdependent.
Under the first model, the Reasonableness Clause mandates a universal

common law principle of announcement is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under
the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 934.
8 See Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 455-58 (1974). In Gooding, a majority
of the Court sanctioned a nighttime search of a home authorized by federal statute without
any proof that a nocturnal entry was necessary for safety reasons or to prevent the destruction of evidence. See id. Although the constitutionality of nocturnal searches by
warrant was not directly raised in Gooding, the majority's opinion "seem[ed] totally
oblivious to the[ ] constitutional considerations" involved with a forcible nighttime entry
into a private home. Id. at 462 (Marshall, J., dissenting). During the Framers' era,
"[s]econd to the requirement for specificity in warrants, the hidden unconstitutionality of
nocturnal searches was the most certain feature of the [fourth] amendment's original understanding. In the 1780's, American law rejected nighttime searches even more than general ones." William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning,

602-1791, at 1510 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School)
(available from UMI Dissertation Services, 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan).
9 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591-98 (1980) (finding no direct common law authority permitting forcible entry of the home to effectuate a warrantless arrest);
id. at 604-11 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the common law did not bar warrantless
entry of a home to make an arrest).
10One such perplexing decision is California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991). In
Hodari, police chased and arrested a man who ran at the sight of their patrol car. See id.
at 623. The Court held that a police show of authority, directed at an individual, is not a
seizure under the Fourth Amendment unless and until the individual yields to or is physi-

cally restrained by the police. See id. at 629. In reaching this result, the Court relied, in
part, on the common law definition of seizure and arrest. See id. at 624-25. In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court's reliance on a narrow, common law definition
of the term "seizure" was misplaced in light of decisions rejecting such restrictive, common law understandings. See id. at 631-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1 See Payton, 445 U.S. at 584-85 (noting that the structure and wording of the
Amendment make it "perfectly clear that the evil the Amendment was designed to prevent
was broader than the abuse of a general warrant" and that "[u]nreasonable searches and
seizures conducted without any warrant at all are condemned by the plain language of the
first clause of the Amendment"); see also id. at 610 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the text of the Amendment establishes that "the Framers were concerned about warrants,
and not about the constable's inherent power to arrest").
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rule that all searches and seizures be reasonable. If the police obtain a warrant, the Warrant Clause contains certain safeguards to ensure the validity of
the warrant. If the police do not obtain a warrant, the search need only be
"reasonable." The second model-known as the "warrant preference rule"requires that the safeguards of the Warrant Clause define the reasonableness
of a given search or seizure. This model posits that the police must ordinarily obtain a warrant prior to an intrusion, unless compelling reasons exist for
proceeding without one. Over the last three decades, these conflicting textual interpretations have divided both the Court and the legal community. 12
The Rehnquist Court favors reading the Amendment as simply requiring that
all searches and seizures be reasonable, not that warrants must be obtained
beforehand.
Constitutional scholars continue to debate the history of the Fourth
Amendment and its relevance to modem search and seizure law. Fortunately, William J. Cuddihy's unprecedented account of the Amendment's
history enlightens the debate. 13 Cuddihy's work is the most comprehensive
and insightful study of the Fourth Amendment's history ever written. 14 The

12See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(reading the text of the Fourth Amendment to limit, rather than to require, warrants);

California v. Robbins, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[Niothing in
the Fourth Amendment itself requires that searches be conducted pursuant to warrants.
The terms of the Amendment simply mandate that the people be secure from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and that any warrants which may issue shall only issue upon probable cause. . . ."); Payton, 445 U.S. at 585 ("Unreasonable searches and seizures con-

ducted without any warrant at all are condemned by the plain language of the first clause
of the Amendment."); TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41 (1969) ("[O]ur constitutional fathers were not concerned about warrantless
searches, but about overreaching warrants."); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 410-15 (1974) (rejecting Telford Taylor's
argument that the Fourth Amendment requires only that warrantless searches be judged
under a general reasonableness standard); Craig Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth
Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1475 (1985) ("By its continued adherence to the
warrant requirement in theory, though not in fact, the Court has sown massive confusion
among the police and lower courts.").
Occasionally, an individual Justice will adopt seemingly contradictory positions on the
significance of the Amendment's text. Compare Payton, 445 U.S. at 585 (Stevens, J.)
(endorsing the view that criteria of Warrant Clause help to define the reasonableness of a
search or seizure), with Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 327 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (reading the Amendment to mandate a reasonableness model, as opposed to a
warrant preference model).
13See generally Cuddihy, supra note 8.
14Two years ago, Justice O'Connor described Cuddihy's dissertation as "one of the
most exhaustive analyses of the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment ever undertaken." Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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goal of this Article, however, is not to review Cuddihy's scholarship. 15
Rather, I wish to compare another scholar's theories on the Fourth Amendment's history and text with Cuddihy's more exhaustive study.
Professor Akhil Reed Amar's constitutional criminal procedure scholarship is bold and controversial. Professor Amar critically examines the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments and proffers new models for their interpretation. 16 Amar explained his vision of the Fourth Amendment in an
earlier article.' 7 I responded with a paper challenging the three main pillars
upon which Amar rests his Fourth Amendment theories.18 More recently, in
his Donahue Lecture at Suffolk University Law School, Amar revisited the
text and history of the Fourth Amendment. 19 At first glance, Professor
Amar's theories regarding the history and text of the Amendment seem attractive, so that many-judges included-might accept his conclusions as
constitutional gospel. This would be unfortunate, because Amar provides an
incomplete account of the Amendment's history. Relying on William Cuddihy's scholarship, this Article examines Amar's judgments about the history
and text of the Fourth Amendment, and explains why judges and lawyers
should not rely on Amar's theories when interpreting the Amendment. 20
15 Professor Morgan Cloud has already written a cogent review of Cuddihy's work.
See Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1707, 1712-13 (1996) ("The work is exhaustive, it is monumental. It is likely to
become essential reading for students of the Fourth Amendment.").
16See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641
(1996); Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles:The SelfIncrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857 (1995); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Fourth Amendment]. Professor Amar's theories on constitutional criminal procedure are presented in a
new book. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997). His other articles on this subject include, Akhil
Reed Amar, Against Exclusion (Except to Protect Truth or Prevent Privacy Violations), 20
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457 (1997); Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of Constitutional
Criminal Procedure,33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123 (1996).
17 See generally Amar, FourthAmendment, supra note 16.
IS See generally Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse
Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994). Other articles challenging Professor
Amar's constitutional criminal procedure theories include, Cloud, supra note 15, at 173245; Donald A. Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedureand ConstitutionalLaw: "Here
I Go Down that Wrong Road Again," 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559 (1996); Yale Kamisar, On
the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93
MICH. L. REv. 929 (1995); Steiker, supra note 5; George C. Thomas III, Remapping the
Criminal Procedure Universe, 83 VA. L. REV. _ (forthcoming) (reviewing AKHIL REED
AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997)).

19See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of
Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, Writs of Assistance].
20 Cuddihy completed his Ph.D. dissertation in 1990. I first learned of it after reading
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION (1988). Levy
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Is THERE A WARRANT REQUIREMENT?

The Donahue Lecture at Suffolk University Law School is designed to
highlight the scholarship of outstanding legal thinkers on contemporary
questions confronting society. Recently, it provided Professor Amar a platform from which to expound upon the history and text of the Fourth
Amendment. Attacking the view that a warrant is necessary to validate a
search or seizure, Amar asserted that the Fourth Amendment "does not require a warrant for each and every search or seizure. It simply requires that
each and every search or seizure be reasonable."21 He insisted that an implicit warrant requirement conflicts with the text and history of the Amendment.
Focusing on the text, Amar emphasized that the Amendment "contains no
third clause explicitly stating that 'warrantless searches and seizures are inherently unreasonable' or explicitly barring all 'warrantless searches and seizures.'" 22 Amar told his audience that "[m]any early state constitutions featured search-and-seizure language rather similar to the Fourth Amendment's,
yet none of these constitutions proclaimed an explicit warrant requirement. " 23 Several state courts expressly rejected "the claim that, by implication, warrants were required for all searches and seizures."24 In addition,
Amar stated that "[n]o leading English or American commentator" or constitutional Framer "explicitly articulated a global warrant requirement."25
Professor Amar claims that the actions of the First Congress also contradict a warrant requirement:
Other historical exceptions to a blanket warrant requirement come
from the First Congress-the same body that drafted the Fourth
Amendment itself. One early statute authorized both warrantless
searches of certain ships and warrantless seizures of various items suspected in connection with customs violations. Another early statute

was Cuddihy's dissertation advisor. Although at the time Cuddihy had not yet completed
his dissertation, in 1988 Professor Levy stated that, "Cuddihy is the best authority on the
origins of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 441 n. 1. Since then, Professor Morgan Cloud

has described Cuddihy's dissertation as "essential reading for students of the Fourth
Amendment," "presenting an overwhelming documentary record" that "serves as a model

of the effort and objectivity that are hallmarks of legal history." Cloud, supra note 15, at
1712-13, 1716, 1746. Interestingly, legal scholars continue to examine and discuss the
Fourth Amendment's history without reference to Cuddihy's work. In both his Donahue
Lecture and in Fourth Amendment First Principles, Professor Amar does not cite or discuss Cuddihy's scholarship.
21 Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 55.
22 Id.
23 Id.

Id. at 56; see also Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 16, at 763 nn. 11-12 (citing
cases).
25 Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 56.
24
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authorized warrantless entry into and inspection of all "houses" and
buildings that had been registered (as required by law) as liquor storerooms or distilleries. If any member of Congress objected to or even
questioned these warrantless searches and seizures on Fourth Amendment grounds, supporters of a warrant requirement have yet to identify
him. 26
For those unfamiliar with the history of the Fourth Amendment, Professor
Amar constructs a seemingly compelling case against warrants. Indeed, after
reading and listening to Amar, many may ask: "Why even have a Warrant
Clause?" Professor Amar's answer neatly fits his interpretation of the
Amendment and its historical meaning. According to Amar, the Warrant
Clause limits warrants. The Framers sought to restrict warrants "[b]ecause a
lawful warrant could immunize the officer who carried it out from the trespass suit that the citizen victim might otherwise have been free to bring....
[I]mmunity was part of the very definition-the purpose-of a lawful warrant. "27
According to Amar, warrantless intrusions did not trigger the safeguards
embodied in the Warrant Clause because "warrantless searches never
28 If
shared" the same immunity given to searches authorized by a warrant.
an officer searched or seized without a warrant, "he could be sued in tort by
the citizen whose person, house, papers, or effects had been trespassed
upon."29 In this tort suit, "if the officer's intrusion were deemed unreasonable, the intrusion would, under Fourth Amendment clause one, be unconstitutional-and thus any governmental authorization the officer might claim
would fall to the ground." 30 Accordingly, "[w]arrants ...were friends of
the officer, not the citizen; and so warrants had to be strictly limited under
clause two. "31

26

Id. at 59 (footnotes omitted).

at 60.
28 Id. at 73. Amar writes that:
[W]arrantless searches did not pose the same threat precisely because they were not
immune from after-the-fact review of the general reasonableness of the government
intrusion. If a particular warrantless search were too intrusive; or if the government
policy gave officials too much discretion; or if the search threatened other constitutional values such as freedom of the press; or if the government policies seemed targeted at certain powerless or unpopular minorities; or if in any number of other ways
the search offended what I have called "constitutional reasonableness" or commonsense reasonableness, judicial review after the fact would invalidate the search under
clause one, and trespass damages, compensatory and punitive, would deter future
violations.
27 Id.

Id. at 63.

29 Id. at
30

60.

Id.

Id. Professor Amar explains that "[a] valid warrant, then, was not merely a preclearance of a search or seizure, but also a preclusion of later tort suits that an outraged
31
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A.

Suing the Officerfor a Warrantless Search Did Not Provide an Effective
Deterrent
Although Professor Amar correctly notes that the possession of a warrant
could afford an officer immunity from after-the-fact tort suits, he fails to
prove either that the Framers intended the Warrant Clause merely to limit
warrants or that specific warrants "were friends of the officer, not the citizen."32 Although specific warrants afforded immunity to officers, they still
served the primary purpose of protecting the privacy of citizens:
A specific warrant may have provided a defense to a lawsuit, but that
was not inconsistent with the Framers' primary concerns. Their primary
concerns were to ensure that searches and seizures would be justified by
probable cause, to restrict their scope with the requirement of particularity, and to enforce these limits with various mechanisms, including
33
independent judicial review.
Another reason to dismiss Amar's cynicism regarding the functions of
specific warrants and to doubt his judgment on the role that lawsuits played
in deterring unreasonable searches and seizures, is that Amar overstates the
deterrent effect of a lawsuit under the common law tort system. An examination of the procedural hurdles that confronted an individual who contemplated suing an officer reveals that the common law system usually tilted in
34
favor of the officer.
At common law, tort suits-framed as trespass or false imprisonment
cases-formed the primary means of penalizing and deterring unreasonable
searches and seizures. Plaintiffs bringing such actions nevertheless encountered numerous procedural obstacles that prevented these suits from becoming an effective deterrent to unreasonable intrusions:
Trespass was quite effective when a forcible search and seizure had occurred without affecting the public interest, but nearly all kinds of general warrants and searches did affect that interest. False imprisonment
was actionable towards those who had instigated it but not towards the
officials who enforced it, and the plaintiff had to prove that malice had
motivated his arrest or imprisonment. The promiscuity of a search, ar-

citizen might seek to bring." Id. Consequently, the Framers designed the Warrant Clause
to ban broad searches. "But warrantless searches did not pose the same threat precisely
because they were not immune from after-the-fact review of the general reasonableness of
the government intrusion." Id. at 63.
32 Id. at 60.
33Cloud, supra note 15, at 1731.
34See Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 872-73 ("By the criteria of the laws that they enacted
in 1789, the framers of the amendment assumed that searchers could be sued for wrongful
acts. The statutory obstacles to resisting or suing a British searcher, however, were formidable. British law stimulated general searches by shielding searchers from accountability.").
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rest, or seizure constituted neither false
imprisonment nor trespass, nor
35
was it even an aggravation of either.
The famous lawsuits brought by John Wilkes and others against Britain's
Secretary of State marked a distinct change in the common law regarding official liability for unreasonable search and seizure. 36 The earlier presumption
that, in cases affecting the public interest, an Englishman's home was the
King's castle 37 was reversed, so that official intrusions upon private property
38
were considered trespass unless authorized by statute or other positive law.
These cases also effected a change in earlier law by permitting an aggrieved
plaintiff to collect damages from the enforcer as well as the instigator of the
39
wrong.
Although the Wilkes Cases provided significant reform, their impact
should not be overstated. The rulings in those cases were directed specifically toward general warrants issued by the Secretary of State for seditious
libel-"[t]he judicial assault on general warrants was selective, not categorical, for it reached only an atypical genre of those warrants."40 Despite these

35Id. at 1219-20 (footnotes omitted).
36 See generally Wilkes v. Halifax, 19 How. St. Tr. 1406 (C.P. 1769); Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765); Money v. Leach, 19 How.
St. Tr. 1001, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075 (C.P. 1764); Beardmore v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr.
1405, 95 Eng. Rep. 790 (C.P. 1764); Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153, 98 Eng.
Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763); Huckle v. Money, 19 How. St. Tr. 1404, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P.
1763).
37See Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 92a (K.B. 1604) ("[The liberty or privilege of
a house doth not hold against the King.").
38 See Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066 ("By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass.... If [a defendant] admits the fact [of
trespass], he is bound to shew by way of justification that some positive law has empowered or excused him.").
39 See id. (finding for the plaintiff in "The Case of Seizure of Papers, being an Action
of Trespass by John Entick, Clerk, against Nathan Carrington and three other Messengers
in ordinary to the King"); Leach, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1075 (granting recovery to the plaintiff
in an action for trespass "against three King's messengers .... for breaking and entering
the plaintiff's house, and imprisoning him, without any lawful or probable cause"); see
also Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1221 (noting that the Wilkes Cases made it possible to sue
not only the instigator of an unreasonable search and seizure, but also the person sent to
carry it out).
40 Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 923-24; see also id. at 1221 ("Most kinds of promiscuous
search and seizure had a statutory basis in the 1760's, . . . and the holdings [in the Wilkes
Cases] exposed to extinction only the few kinds that arose from custom."). Professor
Amar believes the lawsuits arising from the general warrants involved in Wilkes and its
companion cases inspired the Fourth Amendment. See Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra
note 19, at 76-77 (arguing that the Wilkes Cases were far more significant to the Framers
than the writs of assistance controversy); Amar, FourthAmendment, supra note 16, at 772
("Wilkes-and not the 1761 Boston writs of assistance controversy, ... was the paradigm
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changes, other legal obstacles helped shield officers from liability: penalizing
unsuccessful plaintiffs; 4' petitioning judges to find retrospective probable
43
cause; 42 and pleading the general issue.
Under British law, "legislation penalized an unsuccessful suit against an
officer or informer by fining his antagonist double or even treble the damages sought."44 Despite the general nature of official intrusions, many British laws also imposed the burden of proof on the claimant. Thus, "the burden of proof 'in all actions, suites, and informations' involving an
importation rested on the claimant of the goods."45 Similarly, if an individual was arrested as a vagrant or found with venison in his home under a general warrant, the law assumed that the person was guilty of vagrancy or
46
poaching unless he could prove himself innocent.
Another means of shielding officers from liability was to permit them to
request a retroactive finding of probable cause for a seizure. For example, if
a customs officer seized a ship suspected of smuggling but found no contraband on board, the victim might subsequently sue the officer for the warrantless seizure. The officer could then request a judge to find sufficient
probable cause existed to justify the seizure. Such a finding immunized the
47
officer, thereby preventing the plaintiff from pursuing his action.
Although these legal hurdles sometimes discouraged suits, the ultimate legal defense available to officers and informants was the right to "plead the
general issue," which "exposed the meaning of the laws as well as the facts
of the case to challenge and interpretation, thus freeing law enforcement personnel from the necessity of producing special evidence in their behalf."48
Pleading the general issue "automatically increased the burden of proof on
the challenger to a search by denying every allegation in his brief and forcing

search and seizure case for Americans."). Although the Wilkes Cases had an impact in
America, those cases present troubling problems as Fourth Amendment precedent. Lord
Mansfield conceded Parliament's power to enact statutes authorizing writs of assistance
and general warrants. See Leach, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1088. Lord Camden also conceded that

the Secretary of State could issue general warrants to arrest persons for treason. See Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1058 (recognizing the power of a privy counselor to commit in
cases of high treason). Finally, as often happens today, the large money damage award
ordered against the defendants was eventually paid by the Crown. See Cuddihy, supra
note 8, at 999 n.277.
1' See Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 873.
42 See id. at 875-76.
43 See id. at 874-75.
44 Id. at 873.
45 Id. at 874.
46 See id.
47 See id. at 876. The Sugar Act of 1764 included such a provision. See id. at 1200;
see also infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text (discussing the Sugar Act).
48 Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 875.
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49
him to prove each one."
Many of these obstacles to successful tort suits were imported from England to the colonies. For example, a 1714 Virginia impost law discouraged
lawsuits against customs collectors-regardless of whether they had acted
pursuant to a warrant-by requiring unsuccessful plaintiffs to forfeit twice
the amount for which they sued and allowing collectors to plead the general
issue. 50 The Carolinas and Georgia also enacted very similar legislation.51
Legal impediments to tort suits against officers were not confined to the
colonial period. The same Congress that proposed the Fourth Amendment
passed the Collection Act of 1789,52 which granted American officers many
of the same immunities enjoyed by their British counterparts. 53 Although the
Collection Act required warrants for searches of private premises on land, it
permitted warrantless searches of ships5 4 but mandated that if a plaintiff sued
55
for wrongful seizure, he would forfeit double damages if unsuccessful.
The Act also gave officers the option to request that a judge make a retrospective finding of probable cause for the intrusion, thereby defeating any
lawsuit.5 6 The Act also allowed an officer to plead the general issue, re57
gardless of whether a judge found probable cause for the seizure.
Warrantless searches and seizures were theoretically subject to after-thefact judicial review regarding their reasonableness. Professor Amar, however, neglects to inform his readers that both the British and American tort
systems provided substantial procedural obstacles to shield officers from suit.
Although "a lawful warrant could immunize the officer who carried it out
from the trespass suit that the citizen victim might otherwise have been free

49 Id.

&n.117.
See id. at 427-29.
Collection Act of 1789, ch. 5, § 27, 1 Stat. 29.

50 See id. at425
51
52

53 See Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1542.
54 See infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
55 See Collection Act, ch. 5, § 27, 1 Stat. at 43-44.

See id. § 32, 1 Stat. at 47-48.
§ 27, 1 Stat. at 43. Interestingly, although the Collection Act of 1789 established legal obstacles to suing officers who searched pursuant to its provisions, the Excise
56

57 See id.

Act of 1791, also passed by the First Congress, made it much easier to sue. See Act of

Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 199. For example, under the Excise Act the burden of
proving probable cause for a seizure was placed on customs officers, not the claimant of
the property. See id. § 38, 1 Stat. at 208. Although customs officers were allowed to
plead the general issue under the Excise Act, an unsuccessful claimant would not face any
penalties for bringing his lawsuit other than paying the defendant's costs. See id. § 42, 1
Stat. at 209. Under the Excise Act, customs officers did not have the authority to request
a retrospective finding of probable cause for an intrusion. See generally 1 Stat. 199. Finally, the Excise Act provided a jury trial for "any action or prosecution ... against...
[an] officer, for irregular or improper conduct . . . ." Id. § 38, 1 Stat. at 208.
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to bring,"58 forfeiture of double damages, retrospective probable cause, and
a plea of the general issue were nearly as good as immunity to an officer
who conducted a warrantless intrusion. When viewed in this light, after-thefact judicial review of warrantless intrusions did more to shield officers from
liability than to protect the privacy of plaintiffs.
Given that these procedural rules tended to immunize those who conducted
promiscuous, warrantless searches, the warrantless intrusions that fail to
trouble Professor Amar become indistinguishable from the broad, indiscriminate searches that typified general warrants. Thus, history shows that warrantless searches often assumed the characteristics of general warrants, and
the tort system that Professor Amar so confidently touts afforded slight protection against promiscuous intrusion. Lawsuits against officers undoubtedly
formed a part of the Framers' system, but "suing the searcher marked only a
modest beginning towards an effective method of protecting a right respecting search and seizure. "59

B.

The Absence of a WarrantRequirement in the Amendment's Text is Not
Dispositive
Opponents of the warrant preference rule, including Professor Amar, 60 ar-

Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 60.
Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1225-26. I do not mean to discount the prevalence or impact of tort suits against officers. Trespass and false imprisonment cases formed part of
the early apparatus for enforcing norms against unreasonable intrusion. History reveals
that:
[Tihe earliest method of suppressing unreasonable searches and seizures was not the
exclusionary rule but the monetary punishments that juries imposed on those who
searched or seized unlawfully. The prospect of incurring financial ruin at the hands of
a jury undercut the incentive to conduct any search or seizure that the community in
the form of a jury might find unreasonable.
Id. at 1225. What I do suggest, however, is that Professor Amar offers an incomplete description of the common law tort system as it related to claims of unreasonable intrusion.
Although theoretically available in such cases, legal hurdles designed to shield the liability
of officers often tied the hands of claimants with legitimate cases. Moreover, Congress
itself enacted contradictory statutory provisions for the enforcement of claims of unreasonable search and seizure:
[I]nconsistencies between the Collection and Excise Acts of 1789-91 sent opposite
messages on the methods and rigor of enforcement that originally attached to the
Fourth Amendment. Both statutes assumed that legal actions against those who committed unreasonable searches and seizures would discourage the commission of those
activities. By obstructing those actions, however, the Collection Act gave those
agents little incentive to observe the amendment. The Excise Act reversed course.
Id. at 1545.
60 See Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 73 n.81 ("In general, the Constitution requires things-even though these requirements are not always absolute. It rarely
'prefers' things-a word not in the Fourth Amendment, or in the relevant passages of the
Frankfurter opinions Professor Maclin himself cites [in support of the warrant preference
58

59
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gue that nothing in the text of the Fourth Amendment predicates the reasonableness of a search or seizure on the issuance of a warrant. In this they are
correct, but the text of the Amendment also neglects to list who may issue
warrants. Would a Governor, a State Attorney General, or the Chief of Police be authorized to issue a warrant? To borrow Amar's phraseology, the
Amendment contains no third clause explicitly stating that "warrants issued
by such officials are inherently unreasonable" or explicitly barring all
"warrants issued by them."61
A warrant issued by a governor or prosecutor violates the constitutional
norm that law enforcement officials should not decide when constitutional
interests in privacy and personal security should be sacrificed for the greater
good of society. 62 Justice Robert Jackson convincingly states this point:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged
The right of ofin the competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime ....
ficers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only
to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable
security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a

rule]."); cf. Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996) ("The Fourth
Amendment demonstrates a 'strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.'" (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983))).
61 Cf. Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 55 ("[Tlhe Amendment contains no
third clause explicitly stating that 'warrantless searches and seizures are inherently unreasonable' or explicitly barring all 'warrantless searches and seizures.'").
62 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971) (holding that a warrant
issued by the State Attorney General clearly violated the Fourth Amendment's requirement
that warrants be issued by neutral and detached magistrates). Of course, Professor Amar
might respond by arguing that a warrant issued by a law enforcement official is barred by
the history, rather than the text, of the Amendment. This response, however, would be
mistaken. The common law contains many examples of warrants, both general and specific, that were issued by executive officials or law enforcement officers. See Cuddihy,
supra note 8, at 609-15 (noting the power of the King's Secretary of State to issue warrants for crimes against the state and judicial approval of general warrants issued by the
Secretary of State to muzzle the press). One of the cases that Amar says "inspired the
Fourth Amendment," Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 16, at 767, was Entick v.
Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765), in which counsel for the plaintiff in reply conceded that the Secretary of State had the power under a general warrant to arrest persons
for treason: "We do not deny but the Secretary of State hath power to commit for treason
and other offense against the State . . . ." Id. at 814; see also Money v. Leach, 97 Eng.
Rep. 1075, 1088 (C.P. 1765) (noting in dicta the Secretary of State's power, pursuant to
an Act of Parliament, to issue general warrants for vagrancy).
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judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent. 63
The warrant preference rule rests on Justice Jackson's reasoning. Warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable, not because the text of the
Amendment condemns them, but because under normal conditions they are
intrusions-often forcible or coercive-made without the approval of a neutral and detached official. The warrant requirement promotes the norm that
the police should not decide for themselves when to search or seize.
Professor Amar, however, rejects all of this because the text "simply requires that each and every search or seizure be reasonable," so that a warrant
is not always required. 64 This facile and categorical interpretation is not,
however, supported by history. Although the text of the Amendment contains simple language, diverse events produced that language. The text did
not emerge in a vacuum. The history behind the constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures tells us more than the nebulous
language of the text about the right.
Several centuries of British and American legal theory and practice gave
shape and meaning to the Fourth Amendment. 65 Amar's conclusion that
warrants are not required because the text does not expressly call for them
provides a literal answer to a question that implicates decades, if not centuries, of events culminating in the Amendment's formation. Because Professor Amar's historical and textual conclusions are categorical and fail to address significant segments of the Amendment's history, 66 a brief discussion
of the specific warrant's evolution as the preferred method of search and seizure seems appropriate. The evolution of search and seizure methods in the
colonies and the states reveals the following: first, widespread use of promiscuous warrantless intrusions; second, utilization of general warrants for various types of intrusions; and third, the adoption of the specific warrant as the
preferred manner of search and seizure.

63

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).

64 Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 55.
65 See Cloud, supra note 15, at 1724 ("The text [of the Fourth Amendment] articulated
ideas that had percolated through Anglo-American law for centuries.").
66 Professor Amar states that, in an earlier article, I "invoke[ ] a good deal of history,
at a certain level of generality" in defense of a warrant requirement. Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 72 (discussing Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth
Amendment is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994)); see also Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Dirty Harry and the Real Constitution, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1457, 1474
(1997) (contending that "[Maclin's article] offers no evidence" refuting Amar's account of
the Fourth Amendment's history). The following discussion spells out in precise terms
why Professor Amar's interpretation of the history and text of the Fourth Amendment is

deficient.
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II.

FROM THE GENERAL SEARCH TO THE SPECIFIC WARRANT: How DID WE
GET THERE?
Professor Amar takes note of the prevalence of several types of
"warrantless searches and seizures ... at common law and in early America."67 Nevertheless, he neglects to discuss the political and legal fallout that
general searches caused in the colonies and the states prior to the adoption of
the Fourth Amendment. Because of this omission, Amar also fails to address
the evolution of the specific warrant as the preferred mode of search and seizure in the Framers' era.
A.

General Searches in ColonialAmerica
Prior to 1760, general, promiscuous intrusion by government officials
provided the standard method of search and seizure in colonial America:
Customs laws in most of the colonies exposed all suspicious houses to
perpetual search. Beyond those laws, the topics of statutory search and
seizure were many: the militia, the hunting of game, alcoholic consumption; observance of the sabbath, the quality of food and of manufactured products, bankruptcy, debt collection, trading with the French
and Indians, the regulation of servants and slaves, and, occasionally,
vagrancy and dissent. Promiscuous powers of search and seizure were
68
common to the laws [of the colonies] on all these topics.
The New England colonies in general, and Massachusetts in particular, enacted laws that provided for various forms of general searches and seizures
that affected ordinary people. "Massachusetts and its daughter colonies enacted promiscuous search and seizures for more purposes than colonies elsewhere. Moreover, those purposes included the applications for search and
seizure that Englishmen considered most unreasonable, political and religious
control."69 These laws allowed intrusions to "collect taxes, safeguard the
quality of processed merchandise, and discourage debauchery, idleness, and
profanation of the Sabbath."70
The mid-Atlantic colonies also employed warrantless intrusions as a standard method of law enforcement. In mid-seventeenth century New York,
Dutch search methods permitted constables to carry out warrantless searches
of "all suspicious places for stolen goods and for persons suspected of such
crimes as murder, theft, drunkenness, and vagrancy." 71 In the next century,
New York's "constables were still searching suspicious dwellings for contraband and for other purposes in the old warrantless manner at least as late as

67

Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 56.

Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 376-77.
Id. at 379.
70 Id. at 385.
71 Id. at 410.
6

69
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1741."72 A Delaware vagrancy law of 1739 permitted the arrest of "'any
suspicious person'

. . .

as a runaway if he lacked a pass or was unable to

render 'a good and satisfactory account' of himself." 73 In the mid-1700s,
New Jersey permitted general warrantless excise searches of private homes.
Its sheriffs had authority "'to break open any House, Chamber, Shop, Door,
Chests, or Trunks' believed to conceal the property of an absconding
debtor." 74 Constables were also required "'to examine, search, and see what
75
[poor] persons' were entering" the state.
The southern colonies frequently used warrantless intrusions to enforce
various laws, such as those that dealt with smuggling, theft, tobacco, the apprehension of fugitives from justice, or the regulation of slaves. 76 Both
Maryland and Virginia permitted warrantless general customs searches, 77 but
in 1745, Virginia began to use general warrants to search private homes for
evidence of customs violations. 78 Although these general warrants were more
restrictive than warrantless searches because they were valid only during
daylight hours and issued on information provided under oath, they still operated to permit promiscuous searches and were enforced during the rest of
the colonial period. 79 All of the southern colonies enacted laws authorizing
the formation of various types of slave patrols-patrols that conducted some
of "the most intensely general searches in pre-revolutionary America."80
Although all of the colonies allowed various forms of warrantless intrusion, "general warrants were the standard colonial method of search, seizure,
and arrest" by 1760.81 Indeed, most search warrants issued during the colonial period authorized general searches:
[C]ourts, legislatures, governors, their councils, and assorted magistrates in the colonies issued a multitude of proclamations, orders, decrees, and even ad hoc legislative resolves that were worded like general warrants and operated to the same effect. The general warrant, or
something resembling it, was the usual protocol of search and arrest
everywhere in colonial America, excepting Massachusetts after 1756.82

72

Id. at 411.
416.
Id. at 418.

73 Id. at
74
75 Id.

See id. at 421-23 (discussing statutory search and seizure in the southern colonies).
77 See id. at 423-24.
78 See id. at 425-26.
79 See id.
80 Id. at 433 (explaining that such patrols exposed dwellings of the black population,
free as well as slave, to general, warrantless searches).
76

81 Id. at 460.
82 Id. at 468 (footnote omitted) (adding that "actual search warrants in the American
colonies usually authorized promiscuous searches").
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Not limited merely to searches for contraband items, general warrants "were
nearly as varied as the everyday problems that arose [in the colonies]."83
Thus, warrants and a variety of documents akin to warrants authorized
searches in cases of
bastardy, spousal abandonment, and interference with an arrest arising
from the disputed custody of a child. Warrants, proclamations, and
commands to undertake a "diligent search" or to search all suspected
houses also issued with respect to the adequacy of corn supplies, the
impressment of provisions for the military, piracy, contested timber
4
rights, wrongful retention of official records, and fugitive servants.8
In time, the general warrant experienced a loss of legitimacy, resulting
from the colonial practices of general searches and seizures and an intellectual legacy denouncing those methods.85 Although the American repudiation
of general warrants did not begin until after 176086 in most colonies, the colonial period had set the stage for that repudiation.
Massachusetts'sTransformation to Specific Warrants
Initial colonial reaction to the general search tended to focus more on the
personal trauma of intrusion than on the idea that government should be
barred from committing promiscuous invasions of privacy:
Americans continued to assume the legitimacy of general warrants,
searches, and arrests for at least a hundred and twenty years after Englishmen had started to reject it. The English uproar over those warrants
and methods induced no immediate American reverberations, for the
colonists had little to say on those subjects before 1760. The little that
was said focused on the violence of search and seizure and on the inapnot on the general warrant
propriateness of those who experienced it,
87
that enabled those consequences to result.
Colonial attitudes toward general intrusions began to harden in the mideighteenth century at Massachusetts Bay, the first colony to "fathom[ ] the
full implications of specificity in warrants and translate[ ] them into legislation and practice." 88 Although one can find isolated instances in which specific warrants were used, 89 at the mid-point of the eighteenth century, most
colonial legislative bodies continued to employ the general warrant. 90 In

B.

83

Id. at 474-75.

84 Id. at 475 (footnote omitted).
85

See id. at 506.

86 See

id.

Id. at 345.
88 Id. at 663.
87

89

See id. at 663-66 (providing examples of specific search warrants and specific arrest

warrants).
90 See id. at 666-70 (noting attempts by the Connecticut, Maryland, and Virginia legis-
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Massachusetts, however, the General Court-the colonial legislatureenacted several bills that established the specific warrant as the conventional
means of search and seizure. 91 Massachusetts thus became the first jurisdiction to emplace the specific warrant as the conventional method of search and

seizure. 92

Massachusetts's transformation from general searches to specific warrants
occurred slowly, and not by happenstance. The specific warrant emerged
"because of events, especially political events, that were peculiar to
[Massachusetts]. "'93 In particular, two controversies in the 1750s that involved violent, general searches against crucial political groups elicited an
unprecedented legislative reaction against general searches, leading to the
development of the specific warrant. 94 The first was the proposed Excise
latures during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries to ban the general warrant,
but explaining that these efforts were ultimately unsuccessful).
9'See id. at 684-92 (discussing the trend toward the use of specific warrants during the
period from 1756 to 1764).
92 See id. at 684.
93 Id. at 693.
94See id. at 747-48. Hostility toward general warrants and promiscuous intrusions in
Massachusetts dates back to at least the mid-seventeenth century. In 1644, after a sheriff
entered a boarding house without a warrant to arrest a drunk, an angry mob unsuccessfully
attempted to rescue the man. See id. at 695. Rather than condemn the mob, Governor
John Winthrop laid the blame upon the sheriffs improper actions, namely, "fetching a
man out his lodging that was asleep upon his bed without any warrant from authority."
Id.
Nearly forty years later, in 1678, England sent Edward Randolph to Massachusetts to
police British navigation and customs laws in the New England colonies. See MICHAEL
GARIBALDI HALL, EDWARD RANDOLPH AND THE AMERICAN COLONIES

1676-1703, at 46

(1960). Randolph upset the locals by seeking to exercise an unchecked authority to search
and seize in the name of the crown. See id. at 56 ("In England the customs establishment
was elaborate. In New England it was one man, Edward Randolph, who was collector,
searcher, and comptroller of the Plantation Duty.... Elsewhere the comptroller exercised
a check on the operation of the other customs men. Randolph was his own supervisor.").
Although avowedly justified as a means of cracking down on illegality, Randolph's forcible and sometimes violent intrusions took little account of local sentiments regarding
search and seizure. Rather than receiving cooperation from local officials and residents
for his actions, he encountered resistance at every turn. See id. at 57-58. Cuddihy summarizes the connection between Randolph's intrusions and the attitude of Massachusetts's
residents toward those intrusions:
By enforcing general searches vigorously, Randolph intended to subjugate Massachusetts to English law, but he only succeeded in antagonizing that colony into obstructing that law and further rejecting those searches. Although the searches that
Massachusetts legislated were no less general than those in England, Randolph enforced them in the Bay Colony by an alien commission technically independent of
both local and English statutes. By flouting the colony's sensitivities on search and
seizure, which predated his appearance by more than three decades, Randolph intensified them.
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Act of 1754; the second was the public opposition generated by customs officers undertaking to conduct searches ex officio and by writs of assistance.
1. Excise Act of 1754
The Excise Act of 1754 came at the end of "[t]wo and a half decades of
turbulence over search and seizure [that] stimulated the enactment of specific
warrants as the standard mode of search and seizure in Massachusetts. 95
The Act allowed collectors of the tax to "interrogate any citizen under oath
concerning his annual consumption of spirits." 96 Although nothing in the bill
permitted searches of private homes, merchants and residents of urban centers vehemently protested that the measure would allow "a petty Officer to
come into a Gentleman's House, and with an Air of Authority, demand an
Account upon Oath of the Liquor he has drank in his Family for the year
past .

. . ."97

Enemies of the excise assumed that questioning householders

on their doorsteps led inevitably to searching their houses. 98 "Once established, the progression would allegedly extripate all constitutional liberty."99
Cuddihy notes that the "[a]pocalyptic rhetoric against the interrogation
clause seemed out of all proportion to the degree of intrusion that the clause
posed."1°° The uproar, however, was the result of grievances over search
and seizure that had been accumulating in Massachusetts for over a quarter
of a century.'10 The Excise Act occasioned only one of five types of search
and seizure that agitated the colony in the three decades after 1728-the other
types involved the local impost tax, the British customs service, an unsuccessful land bank scheme that authorized general warrants to recover the records of the bank's directors, and the impressment of seamen into the Royal
Navy. 1°2 The interrogation clause, therefore, "was the last straw, not the
03
first one, in public discontent with the search process."
Within two years of the Excise controversy, the General Court passed a

Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 714. Notwithstanding the hostility that Randolph's intrusions
generated, Massachusetts officials, like officials of other colonial governments, continued
to enact and enforce general searches in the latter half of the seventeenth century and in
the first half of the eighteenth century.
95 Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 721.
96 See id. at 721-22.
97M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 111 (1978) (quotation omitted).
98See Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 723.
99 Id.

100 Id. at 725 (noting that the interrogation clause threatened privacy less than did the
physical searches that had long been part of the local excise laws).
101 See id.
102See id.
103 Id. For more on the Excise Act, see generally Paul S. Boyer, Borrowed Rhetoric:
The Massachusetts Excise Controversy of 1754, 21 WM. & MARY Q. 328 (1964)
(providing an in-depth discussion of the dispute over the Massachusetts liquor excise bill).
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law that designated specific search warrants as the method for turning up
military deserters.104 The General Court also enacted bills replacing general
search warrants with specific warrants for the enforcement of impost, excise,
and poaching laws. 105 Although these early specific warrants would not meet
current constitutional standards, many contained various procedural safeguards that the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment would subsequently incorporate. For example, the laws mandating specific warrants for
enforcement of military desertion, impost, excise, and poaching laws, required searches to be carried out during daylight hours and warrants to specify a particular place, identified under oath, as the target of a search. 0 6 The
desertion bill even went so far as to protect ships from warrantless intrusions. 1
Similarly, some laws extended the particularity requirement
"beyond places to persons and things."108 Thus, warrants directed against
military deserters and poachers authorized the arrest of named individuals on
the basis of an accusation made under oath.1°9 The excise law allowed specific arrest warrants to work in conjunction with specific search warrants.110
Another feature of these laws was that they required officers to satisfy a
"rudimentary version of probable cause.""' Although magistrates did not
possess the authority to deny a warrant or to decide for themselves whether
sufficient cause existed for a particular search, the law nonetheless required
informants to swear that they possessed knowledge of lawbreaking at the targeted premises. 112 Thus, the law required officers seeking warrants to search
for military deserters to allege "vehement" suspicion of the specific whereabouts of a deserter. 113 Private individuals claiming knowledge of a violation
of the excise or poaching laws had to declare "just cause" or "just grounds"
for their suspicion.114 Unlike earlier Massachusetts laws that merely penalized the abuse of general warrants, the laws requiring specific warrants better secured civil liberty because "they prevented rather than discouraged
" 115
promiscuous searches.

104

See Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 684-85.

See id.; see also id. at 732 (stating that the specific warrants that Massachusetts legislated after 1756 were a ramification of the excise controversy that had begun in 1754).
106 See id. at 686.
107 Id.
105

108 Id.

,o9 See id.

110See id.

"I Id. at 687.
113

See id.
Id.

114

Id.

115

Id. at 688.

112

19971

HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

945

2. Searches Ex Officio and Writs of Assistance
A second crucial factor in the evolution toward specific warrants in Massachusetts was the public opposition generated by customs officers undertaking to conduct searches ex officio, that is, under the authority derived
from their commissions. Prior to 1755, local customs officers carried out
warrantless searches under an assumed power of forcible entry ex officio.
Massachusetts residents vigorously opposed these intrusions, thereby impelling Governor William Shirley to begin issuing his own warrants to customs
officers. 116 These gubernatorial warrants, however, mirrored the forcible
powers previously exercised by customs officers ex officio and were of dubious legality. 11 7 Eventually, opposition to gubernatorial warrants forced Shir8
ley to order his officers to obtain writs of assistance from the judiciary. 1
Writs of assistance "were anathema in the colonies .
"..."119
Historians
Revolution.12
the
of
cause
a
major
as
writs
to
the
resistance
described
have
The writs generated such a high degree of opposition because they intruded
upon privacy even more than general warrants:
The more dangerous element of the writ of assistance ... was that it
was not returnable at all after execution, but was good as a continuous
license and authority during the whole lifetime of the reigning sovereign. The discretion delegated to the official was therefore practically
absolute and unlimited. The writ empowered the officer and his deputies and servants to search, at their will, wherever they suspected uncustomed goods to be, and to break open any receptacle or package fal21
ling under their suspecting eye.
When Governor Shirley directed his customs officers to obtain writs of assistance, he set in motion a series of events that culminated in Boston's 1761
writs of assistance controversy. Shirley's issuance of writs of assistance was
predicated not on legislation, but on assumed powers as governor. 122 The
116 See SMITH, supra note 97, at 114-15 (stating that if "forcible search was to continue
as a means of maximizing the new profitability of seizure there needed to be more impres-

sive authority than a mere customs officer's commission; and the governor's warrants
were brought in as the answer"). Smith states that, "with moderation, [the] purported
power of search ex officio might have been gotten away with." Id. at 118. He notes,
however, that "[wihat went wrong in Massachusetts perhaps was that moderation ceased to
be observed." Id. (discussing the vigilance with which all customs officers were urged to
discover contraband goods).
I" See id. at 121.
118 See id. at 122.
119

120

supra note 12, at 38.
See generally O.M. Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in

TAYLOR,

THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1939).
121

NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 54 (1937).
122

See Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 758-59.
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writs, which empowered customs officers to enter and inspect houses without
any warrant, contradicted local law.123 Customs officers, however, obtained
writs of assistance on request as routine accessories to their commissions,
without alleging illegal activity as a precondition for them, without judicial
superintendence, and without the possibility of refusal.1 24 Several victims of
these intrusions offered physical and legal resistance. 125
While many judges and scholars have written on colonial opposition to
writs of assistance, the role played by James Otis, Jr. in Paxton's Case has
merited their special attention. In Paxton's Case, Otis was counsel for a
group of Boston merchants opposed to the writs of assistance.1 26 Because
writs of assistance remained in force only until the death of the reigning
monarch, when George III died on October 25, 1760, customs agents were
obliged to apply to the Superior Court for new writs. 127 Paxton's Case
be128
gan when the merchants petitioned the Superior Court to deny the writs.
In opposing the writs, Otis protested that only specific warrants were reasonable and asserted that "'the freedom of one's house' was among 'the most
essential branches of English liberty,"' and that "the operation of writs of
assistance would 'totally annihilate' that freedom."'129 Cuddihy writes:
Otis wove precedent, history, constitutional philosophy, and the higher
law into a passionate indictment of the writ of assistance. The pertinence of his brief to the Fourth Amendment, however, inhered less in
his eloquence than in his categorical repudiation of general warrants and
in his tandem insistence on specific warrants as their replacements.
Many Englishmen had assailed different types of promiscuous search
and seizure, but Otis implicitly rejected them all and offered a successor
30
to them as well. 1
Otis's proclamation that "only specific writs were legal was the
first recorded
13 1
declaration of the central idea to the specific warrant clause."
Notwithstanding Otis's arguments, the Superior Court unanimously de-

113 See id. at 759 (noting that local legislation allowed entrance into houses only by specific, not general, warrant).
124 See id. at 762-63.
115 See id. at 759-60.
126 See id. at 757.
127 See id. at 763. Charles Paxton was a customs officer in Massachusetts. See id. at
760.
See id. at 764; see also id. at 804 ("Paxton's Case was only one of a cluster of law
suits that were designed to cripple the customs service and neutralize interference with
mercantile activity.").
129 Id. at 757-58.
130 Id. at 766-68 (footnote omitted). For additional discussion of Otis and his role in
Paxton's Case, see SMITH, supra note 97, at 312-86.
131 Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 768.
128
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cided to issue new writs. 132 The issuance of new writs to customs officers
brought a legislative response. On March 5, 1762, within six months of the
Superior Court's approval of the new writs, the General Court passed a
measure designed to frustrate that ruling. 133 Under the proposed bill, writs
of assistance were to issue only under oath, were to continue in force for no
more than seven days, and were required to particularly identify not only the
informer and the person accused, but the premises at which contraband was
allegedly concealed. 134 In enacting these measures, the General Court sought
to rewrite the Superior Court's general writs into specific search warrants. 135
Governor Francis Bernard believed the bill was a stratagem to permit continued smuggling by political cronies of the General Court. 13 6 After con1 37
sulting with the judges of the Superior Court, he vetoed the measure.
Governor Bernard's cynicism notwithstanding, the legislature's proposed restrictions on writs of assistance appear consistent with earlier laws mandating
specific warrants:
[T]he measure was no subterfuge, for only its publicizing of informants
was novel. Most restrictions on searches in the proposal also characterized local legislation respecting revenues and military desertion. The
bill was little more than another success by specific warrants in Massachusetts law, an effort to compel British customs officers to observe
the
38
restraints on searches that applied to their local counterparts. 1
With his role in Paxton's Case, Otis took "the British ideology of search
and seizure beyond condemnation of general warrants to an appreciation of
specific ones as their replacements." 139
C.

Other States'Adoption of Specific Warrants
The specific warrant emerged slowly, in response to political currents. 14°

See id. at 798.
See id. at 818 (noting that the legislature's campaign to nullify the court's ruling was
orchestrated by Otis, who was elected to the House of Representatives in May 1761, and
his father, who was picked as the House's speaker).
134 See id.
135 See id.; see also id. at 819 (noting that the proposed law coincided precisely with the
specific warrants that Otis had advocated during Paxton's Case).
136 See id. at 820.
137 See id. at 819.
138 Id. at 820 (footnotes omitted).
139 Id. at 824.
140 Cuddihy writes:
Americans began to reject the general warrant in the 1760's for the same reasons
that Englishmen of earlier centuries had abnegated methods of search and seizure:
violence, politics, and a sudden increase in the accustomed types of search [and] seizure. The colonists became champions of the specific warrant not because it was specific but because they associated the general warrant with violent British efforts to
132
133
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Although by the end of 1764 the General Court of Massachusetts Bay had
embraced specific warrants to such an extent that, with the exception of isolated areas, "no statute authorizing a search had employed general warrants," 141 other colonies did not follow Massachusetts's lead in adopting the
specific warrant as the preferred method of search and seizure. Despite successful opposition to writs of assistance in other colonies, America's victory
over England in the Revolutionary War, and the prohibition of general war42
rants in many state constitutions, general searches continued to occur.1 It
was not until the 1780s that most states began to adhere to their constitutional
143
prohibitions on the use of general warrants.
By the late 1780s the specific warrant formed the primary method of
search and seizure in several states. For example, in Massachusetts, "after
the constitution of 1780 took effect, the only warrants that Massachusetts law
created were specific ones of the type that its excise and impost taxes had
introduced in 1756-57."144 Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Delaware also
enacted legislation that favored specific warrants for official searches. 145
Meanwhile, in New Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Virginia,
specific and general warrants coexisted in each state, and "local law and its
makers vacillated between them." 146 To be sure, the change from general to
specific warrants was not universal. General warrants remained the primary
mode of search and seizure in New York, Maryland, both Carolinas, and

subjugate them politically .... The emergence of the specific warrant in America
was a byproduct of America's political contest with Britain.
Id. at 1171.
141 Id. at 691. Cuddihy notes that general searches for defective leather, "an anachronism dating from 1698," were still allowed, and that general searches respecting debtors,
bakeries, and public inns, continued to be a part of the Bay Colony's statutory framework.
Id. at 691-92.
142 See William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man's House Was Not His Castle:
Origins of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q.
371, 398 (1980) ("The discretionary search survived until the very eve of the Fourth
Amendment."); Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1277 ("General warrants remained the orthodox
mode of search and seizure in five states: New York, Maryland, both Carolinas, and
Georgia.").
143 Although the states continued to utilize general warrants, a few "American theorists

not only rejected promiscuous searches and seizures but moved towards the consensus that
specific warrants should displace them as the ordinary device for arresting citizens and
searching their dwellings." Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1135. Although there was no unanimity among scholars advocating the specific warrant, "[t]he specific warrant had established an enclave in American legal thought before the revolution commenced, but that
enclave was of modest proportions." Id. at 1139.

Id. at 1291.
See id. at 1292-93.
146 Id. at 1287.
144

145
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Georgia.147 Nevertheless, events indicate not only a preference for specific
warrants as a precondition to search, 148 but also a readiness to expand the
right against unreasonable search and seizure beyond the textual confines
prescribed in state constitutional provisions.
The restrictions that many states imposed on federal searches within their
jurisdictions is an illustration of this second phenomenon. In 1787, Congress
proposed a federal impost tax that provided for federal searches within the
several states.149 In direct response, seven states limited federal searches to
daytime hours, and nine states required that federal searches be conducted by
0
warrant only. 15
More significantly, North Carolina and Rhode Island
not only tied enforcement of the Congressional impost to warrants but
also demanded that those warrants be specific. The remaining states
simply instructed Congress to observe their constitutions in collecting
the impost, automatically preventing the federal usage of general warrants in Maryland and Delaware. By one means or another, a total of
four states had deprived the national authority of general warrants before the the [sic] Fourth Amendment did so. 151
The Fourth Amendment therefore "inherited a tradition in which the ambit of
federal search and seizure was already tighter than that of the states."1 52
In sum, the Amendment's history reveals that in the seventeenth century,
general searches and the general warrant preponderated over the specific
warrant. By the eighteenth century, however, the specific warrant was the
customary method of intrusion and the general warrant, although still utilized, existed only as an exception to the specific warrant. After the Revolution, both the "usages of th[e specific] warrant and the states that used it
multiplied." 5 3 By 1787, seven states had embraced the specific warrant as
147See id. at 1277.

For instance, a 1772 New York statute concerning excessive amounts of gunpowder
prescribed specific search warrants. See id. at 1145. But cf. Robert M. Piter, Independent State Search and Seizure Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of Appeals'
Questfor PrincipledDecisionmaking, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 39 n. 125 (1996) (taking note
of a New York statute of 1784 that authorized the issuance of a warrant "to search for
gunpowder in any building or place whatsoever"). In March 1772, Pennsylvania enacted
measures requiring specific warrants to enforce its excise law, but on the same day also
passed a law permitting general warrantless searches of houses and ships for leather items.
See Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1147. In 1769, Virginia eliminated the ex officio search
148

powers by which justices of the peace had been permitted to search ships for smuggled
tobacco. See id. at 1146. From then on such searches had to be authorized by warrants,
and the information justifying the search had to be given under oath. See id.
149See Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1347.
150 See id. at 1349.
151 Id. at 1350-51 (footnotes omitted).
152

Id. at 1351.
1299.

153 Id. at
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the standard means for searches and seizures. 154 This history undermines
Professor Amar's categorical assertion that warrants were not required by the
Framers.

III. HISTORICAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE WARRANT PREFERENCE RULE
A. Laws Passed by the FirstCongress Do Not Subvert the Warrant
PreferenceRule
Professor Amar does not discuss the evolution of specific warrants. Perhaps he would consider this historical evidence relevant only to deciding
whether the Massachusetts Constitution, as opposed to the Fourth Amendment, prefers warrants for searches and seizures. In Amar's view, Congress, not the states, authored the legislation most germane to an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Professor Amar asserts that laws passed by
the First Congress subvert the warrant preference rule. However, his account of Congress's actions is misleading for two reasons: first, Amar does
not discuss the inconsistencies in Congress's approach to search and seizure;
and second, Congress did on two occasions require a warrant as a precondition to a valid search.
According to Amar, the Collection Act of 1789 "authorized both warrantless searches of certain ships and warrantless seizures of various
items ... ."155 The Excise Act of 1791 "authorized warrantless entry into
and inspection of all 'houses' and buildings that had been registered (as required by law) as liquor storerooms or distilleries." 156 Amar comments that
"[i]f any member of Congress objected to or even questioned these warrantless searches and seizures on Fourth Amendment grounds, supporters of a
57
warrant requirement have yet to identify him."1
There are at least two reasons why supporters of a warrant requirement
have not focused on congressional debate over the search and seizure provisions of the Collection and Excise Acts. First, little or no evidence of congressional motivation exists on this point: "The documentation on the Collection Act mentions no debates of its sections concerning search and
seizure. In other words, that act does not offer a back-stairs approach to the
original meaning of the Fourth Amendment because debates of those sections
either never occurred or were not recorded."158 The second reason why
154 See id. at 1338 ("[A] majority of the original states, seven of thirteen, had completed all or nearly all of the legal transition from general to specific warrants in five brief
years, 1782-87.").
155 Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 59.
156

Id.

1'7

Id.

15S8
Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1491 n.256.

This is not to suggest, however, that the
Collection Act should be ignored when studying the Fourth Amendment's history. As
Cuddihy explains:
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proponents of the warrant requirement do not-and should not-fixate on
congressional approval of the search and seizure provisions of the Collection
and Excise Acts is the conflict among the Framers as to the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, and in particular, the Warrant Clause.
Professor Amar observes that section 24 of the Collection Act authorized
warrantless searches and seizures of certain ships.159 Nevertheless, the text
of the statute does little to support Amar's theory that the First Congress
disavowed a warrant requirement. Although section 15 of the Collection Act
did authorize warrantless, suspicionless searches of ships, 16° section 24
authorized two different types of searches. One type permitted officers to
board a ship where they "shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or
merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed ....-161The second type of
search authorized by section 24 concerned situations in which officers had
reason to believe that taxable goods were concealed inside a building:
[E]very [duly authorized officer who] shall have cause to suspect a concealment [of taxable goods], in any particular dwelling-house, store,
building, or other place, they or either of them shall, upon application
on oath or affirmation[1621 to any justice of the peace, be entitled to a

By 1791, Congress had established laws on search warrants, warrantless searches
and seizures, probable cause, and other aspects of the Fourth Amendment that endured for the balance of the eighteenth century. The Collection Act of 1789 was most
significant, for it identified the techniques of search and seizure that the framers of
the amendment believed reasonable while they were framing it. Congressional consideration of the search warrant section of that act commenced only twelve days before the amendment originated, and that section became law just three weeks before
the amendment assumed definitive form. The Collection Act explicated the Fourth
Amendment, for both documents expressed the thoughts of the same persons upon the
same subject at the same time.
Id. at 1490-93 (footnotes omitted).
159 See Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 59 (construing section 24 of the

Collection Act); see also Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 16, at 766 (noting that
section 24 of the Collection Act "pointedly authorized" warrantless searches of ships).
160 See Collection Act of 1789, ch. 5, § 15, 1 Stat. 29, repealed by Act of Aug. 4,
1790, ch. 35, § 74, 1 Stat. 145, 178. Section 15 provided that:
[Ilt shall and may be lawful for the collector, naval officer and surveyor, of any port
of entry or delivery, at which any ship or vessel may arrive, to put on board such
ship or vessel one or more inspectors, who shall make known to the person having
charge of such ship or vessel, the duties he is to perform by virtue of this act ....
Id. § 15, 1 Stat. at 40. Professor Morgan Cloud has explained that the types of intrusion
permitted by section 15 "would be classified today as administrative searches and seizures ... because the event triggering the entry was simply the arrival of a ship in a
port." Cloud, supra note 15, at 1740. The inspections allowed by section 15 were designed to establish an administrative record to ensure that the cargo unloaded had been
subject to taxes. See id.
161Collection Act, § 24, 1 Stat. at 43.
162The Collection Act of 1789 was repealed the following year. See Act of Aug. 4,
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warrantto enter such house, store, or other place (in the day time only)
and there to search for such goods, and if any shall be found, to seize
and secure the same for trial ....163
Amar says the Collection Act "authorized, but did not require, warrants to
search houses, stores, and buildings; the statute did not say that no search or
seizure could occur without a warrant, but only that, under certain conditions, naval officers and customs collectors would be 'entitled to a warrant."164 But the plain language of the Act proves Amar wrong. Under section 24, Congress allowed warrantless searches of ships but not of buildings.
Congressional authorization of warrantless searches of ships is not surprising
when one recalls that such searches have an ancient pedigree. Before the
Revolution, "[s]hips and waterborne craft in general were subject to a statutory power of customs search. This power was markedly looser than its
counterpart on land; in particular, there was no question of it depending
upon the presence of a peace officer and a writ of assistance." 65 Warrantless
searches of houses, however, were a different kettle of fish. This disproves
Amar's position that Congress never articulated a warrant requirement. 166

1790, § 74, 1 Stat. at 178. Section 24 of the Collection Act was reenacted as section 48 of
the repealing Act. See id. § 48, 1 Stat. at 170. The only substantial difference between
the two sections is that the second act omits any reference to obtaining a warrant on
"affirmation." See id.
163 Collection Act, § 24, 1 Stat. at 43 (emphasis added).
164 Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 16, at 766.
165 SMITH, supra note 97, at 472.
166 Professor Amar contends that section 24 did not require warrants for searches of
buildings, only that "under certain conditions, naval officers and customs collectors would
be 'entitled to a warrant.'" Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 16, at 766. Amar's
reading of section 24 defies the plain language of the statute and is not shared by scholars.
See, e.g., Cloud, supra note 15, at 1741 n.118 (explaining that section 24 "authorized
warrantless searches of ships if the officers had reason to suspect a violation of the law,
but prescribed warrant procedures for similar searches on land" and that this interpretation
of section 24 is bolstered by other provisions of the statute); Cuddihy, supra note 8, at
1488 ("[Section 24 of t]he Collection law exposed every ship to a warrantless search on
reasonable suspicion that it concealed taxable property. Specific search warrants, however, were required ashore. Each warrant was valid only in the daytime and required a
sworn complaint that designated a 'particular' building.").
Although section 24 mandated warrants for searches of buildings, those warrants would
not have passed constitutional muster under current Fourth Amendment standards. Magistrates had "no discretion to refuse a warrant. Any officer who had informed a justice [of
the peace] that he suspected a concealment of taxable articles in a particular place and
swore to it under oath or affirmation was 'entitled to a warrant to enter such house.'" Id.
at 1527 (quoting Collection Act, § 24, 1 Stat. at 43). Thus, the statutory language
"entitled to a warrant" was meant to limit the authority of a magistrate to withhold a warrant from an officer who provided the requisite oath and statement of suspicion required
by the statute. This language was not meant, as Amar suggests, to give an officer discre-
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Amar also claims that because the Excise Act of 1791167 permitted warrantless searches of registered buildings, it thus negates the idea that Congress believed that a warrant was a precondition to a valid search. 168 Amar's
reading of this statute is, however, only partially correct. The Excise Act
authorized not only warrantless searches, but also searches conditioned on
specific warrants.
The two types of searches authorized by the Excise Act were controlled by
different criteria. Section 29 of the Act authorized warrantless searches of
registered buildings for taxable alcohol. 169 Although section 29 created an
exception to the accepted norm that searches of buildings required specific
warrants, the law was intended to satisfy the purposes served by specific
warrants:
[Alexander] Hamilton's intent was to provide a method of search
without warrant as specific and unobjectionable as that which the specific warrant imposed. Indeed, his excise contained an even tighter
method of search than had the [Collection Act]. Both statutes limited
searches to named buildings, but the excise went further and enabled a
building's owner to restrict the search to such portions of it as he chose.
Furthermore, only those entrepreneurs who operated multiple stills or a
fifty gallons capacity were subject to warrantless excise
still beyond
70
searches. 1
While section 29 authorized warrantless searches of registered buildings,
section 32 of the Excise Act allowed another type of search not discussed by
Professor Amar. Section 32 authorized the inspection of non-registered
buildings by specific warrant only if there existed "reasonable cause or suspicion, to be made out to the satisfaction" of the magistrate:
That in case any of the said spirits shall be fraudulently deposited, hid
or concealed in any place whatsoever, with intent to evade the duties
thereby imposed upon them, they shall be forfeited. And for the better
discovery of any such spirits so fraudulently deposited, hid or concealed, it shall be lawful for any judge of any court of the United States,
or either of them, orfor any justice of the peace, upon reasonablecause
of suspicion, to be made out to the satisfaction of such judge or justice,
by the oath or affirmation of any person or persons, by special warrant
or warrantsunder their respective hands and seals, to authorize any of

tion to search a building with a warrant if it suited his purposes to do so.
167 Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 199.
i1 See Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 59.
169 See Excise Act, § 29, 1 Stat. at 206. Section 29 provided that, "[i]t shall be lawful

for the officers of inspection of each survey at all times in the daytime, upon request, to
enter into all and every the houses [sic], store-houses, ware-houses, buildings and places
which shall have been [registered under the act] . . . ." Id.
17 Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1506 (footnote omitted).
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the officers of inspection, by day, in the presence of a constable or
other officer of the peace, to enter into all and every such place or
places in which any of the said spirits shall be suspected to be so
fraudulently deposited, hid or concealed, and to seize and carry away
shall be there found so fraudulently, hid or
any of the said spirits which
171
concealed, as forfeited.
Thus, in examining the laws passed by the First Congress, proponents of
the warrant requirement correctly reach a different conclusion than Professor
Amar as to the Fourth Amendment's meaning. Proponents recognize that the
various laws Congress enacted concerning search and seizure contained differing requirements and criteria for searching buildings, 72 as well as conflicting concepts of probable cause and varying standards for magistrates to
apply when issuing warrants. 173 Put simply, supporters of the warrant requirement refuse to stake their constitutional arguments on congressional action. Legislation that Congress enacted "while the Fourth Amendment was
before it and the ratifying legislatures facilitated incompatible interpretations
of important segments of that amendment. Those who advocate adherence to
the amendment's original understanding should consider that its authors expressed conflicting understandings of probable cause and of an enforcement
174
mechanism."
By the time Congress proposed the Fourth Amendment for ratification,
Americans had experienced unreasonable search and seizure from many
171Excise Act, § 32, 1 Stat. at 207 (emphasis added).

Unlike the provisions of the
Collection Act, the Excise Act gave magistrates discretion to reject an officer's application
for a search warrant. See id. This distinction prompted one contemporary of the Framers' era to note that, "'the discretion [to issue an excise warrant] is not in the officer of the
revenue but in a magistrate, and even he cannot grant such a warrant but in consequence of
reasonable cause of suspicion.'" Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1528 (quoting John Neville,
An Address to the Citizens of Westmoreland, Fayette and Allegheny Counties on the Revenue Law, GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES, Dec. 31, 1791, at 284).
172 Although the Excise Act permitted warrantless searches of registered buildings,
"[t]he goal of Hamilton's excise searches was not to legitimate warrantless searches of
houses but to indicate that distilleries did not constitute dwelling houses or afford the same
degree of privacy." Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1506-07.
173Under the Collection Act, justices of the peace had no authority to refuse the issuance of a warrant if a customs officer swore he had cause to suspect that taxable goods
were concealed in a building. See Collection Act, § 24, 1 Stat. at 43. The Excise Act,
however, made warrants available to government officers only if a magistrate was satisfied
that there was reasonable cause for suspecting that untaxed spirits were concealed in an
unregistered building. See Excise Act, § 32, 1 Stat. at 207. The "differences in probable
cause between the [Collection] and Excise Acts indicated that Congress had not changed its
mind but was of two minds on the subject. Both acts, and the hostile concepts of probable
cause that they expressed, remained in simultaneous effect for the balance of the century."
Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1528-29.
174Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1556.

1997]

HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE FOURTHAMENDMENT

955

quarters. Their desire to protect the privacy and security of their homes
from promiscuous intrusion led the Framers to create a right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure. Viewing the general warrant and its close
cousin, the writ of assistance, as law enforcement instruments that substantially undermined their privacy and security, Americans strongly resented
them. The origins and history of the Fourth Amendment reveal that in devising alternative methods of enforcement, legislatures and judges 175 alike
considered the specific warrant to be the best available tool to protect privacy
and check the discretionary powers of officers. As Professor Cloud has
aptly observed: "General warrants may have been akin to a license to search,
but specific warrants came into prominence, particularly in the United States
after 1782, precisely because they protected citizens' rights against such unreasonable methods." 176
The Warrant Preference
In his Donahue Lecture, Professor Amar criticizes my advocacy of the
warrant preference rule. Among other things, he states that I fail to provide
any statements from the Framers' era to the effect that "warrants are preferred."177 By this, I assume that Professor Amar means statements that indicate a preference for warrants in situations necessitating governmental intrusion for the maintenance of legal norms. If this is indeed what Professor
Amar has in mind, the decades leading up to the ratification of the Fourth
Amendment offer several instances in which colonial and state legislatures
announced not only a warrant preference, but a warrant requirement, when
enacting search or seizure laws. Example after example illustrates discontent
178
over promiscuous searches without warrants.
B.

175 The role played by colonial judges in opposing writs of assistance has been well

documented. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 97, at 5 ("[Jiudges in colonial America...
were defying and defeating British overlordship years before a single solider took to the
field."); Dickerson, supra note 120, at 74 (noting that despite pressure from British officials, the colonial "judiciary from Connecticut to Florida, with one exception, stood firm
in opposing the legality of the particular form of writ demanded of them and continued in
their judicial obstinacy through six years of nearly coristant efforts to force them to
yield"); Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1066-67 ("In the period 1769-72, no colonial court beyond New Hampshire or Massachusetts granted the general writ that the customs authorities wanted, and most included constitutional or legal exegeses in their grounds of refusal."); Joseph R. Frese, Writs of Assistance in the American Colonies 1660-1776, at
300 (1951) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author)
("The real significance of the battle over the writs of assistance with the American Commissioners of Customs lies in the almost universal opposition of the colonial courts.").
176 Cloud, supra note 15, at 1730.
177Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 72.
178 Cuddihy writes:
Th[e] debate on the necessity for a federal bill of rights rejuvenated public interest in
the right concerning search and seizure. As the state conventions deliberated the Con-
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stitution, from October 1787 to March 1788, thirteen Antifederalist authors from
Connecticut to Virginia predicted that general warrants, writs of assistance, and general excise searches without warrant would be among the consequences of ratification.

Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1368-69 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
A third cluster of [Antifederalist] writers, two of whom also protested general
warrants, took aim at the possibility of general searches without warrantto enforce a
federal excise ....

These Antifederalist essays demonstrated how far constitutional

thought on search and seizure had progressed since 1782. Like the pre-revolutionary
pamphleteers in Britain and the colonies, the Antifederalists objected to any general
search or warrant that was its bearer's pass key to every man's house.
Id. at 1375-76 (emphasis added).
Unlike the pre-revolutionary authors on search and seizure, these Antifederalists
opposed far more than general warrants. Speaking for the nation in the absence of
Federalist rebuttal, the Antifederalist opinion-makers agreed the federal authority
[Their] opposition to searches
should repudiate those warrants categorically ....
other than by the general warrant, implied a desire to divest the central government
not only of that warrant but of all relatives of it that jeopardized privacy.
Id. at 1378 (emphasis added).
In the year from September 1787 to September 1788, about as many official and personal protests against abusive government searches had appeared in print as had in the
entire decade before the revolution and many times more than in the interval since the
revolution.
Thought on search and seizure, however, had also changed. Although the general
warrant and its cousin, the writ of assistance, had easily attracted 90% of the pre-war
discussion, the debate of 1787-88 had a wider focus. The general warrant was no
longer the only kind of unreasonable search. The ratifying conventions and pamphleteers increasingly spoke in the plural, of unreasonable searches and seizures.
General excise searches and search warrants issued groundlessly were condemned
almost as much as the general warrant. Given the volume and intensity of public interest, only the blind or deaf could have been unaware of this expansion.
In short, the debate on search and seizure of 1787-88 not only provided an impetus for what became the Fourth Amendment but defined its contents. That debate
connected the enlarged understanding of unreasonable searches and seizures that had
emerged after 1782 with the guarantee against those procedures of 1789. In pamphlets, newspapers, and ratifying conventions, Americans served notice that they
wanted a federal right regarding search and seizure that transcended the mere denunciation of general warrants that their state constitutions provided.
Id. at 1402-03 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Prohibition of the general warrant was part of a larger scheme to extinguish general searches categorically. The implicit unconstitutionality of general searches without warrant predated the amendment. In the most widely publicized protests on the
search process prior to the amendment, the Continental Congress, in 1774, had unconditionally condemned promiscuous, warrantless searches by customs and excise
officers.
While the Constitution was being ratified, moreover, nearly as many authors had
execrated general excise searches without warrant as had similar searches by warrant,
and the protests came from both Federalist and Antifederalists. The Federalists at the
Maryland ratifying convention of 1788 had initially supported an Antifederalist denunciation of general warrants that also embraced promiscuous excise searches.
Although most evidence against general searches without warrant was literary, not
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For example, the Massachusetts General Court exhibited a preference for
specific warrants in at least sixteen measures it enacted between 1754-1764
requiring specific warrants for enforcement of the military desertion, impost,
excise, and poaching laws.1 79 After the Massachusetts Superior Court issued
new writs of assistance to customs officers, the General Court again demonstrated a preference for specific warrants when it proposed a bill mandating
that writs of assistance take a form very similar to specific warrants.180 Indeed, after Massachusetts adopted its 1780 constitution, whenever the General Court enacted search and seizure laws, it mandated the use of specific
warrants. 181 In so doing, the General Court must surely have expressed a
preference for specific warrants over promiscuous warrantless searches.
If warrants were not the preferred method of search in the years leading
up to the ratification of the Fourth Amendment, why did the legislatures of
Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Delaware enact laws establishing specific
warrants as the standard method of search? 82 Why did the Pennsylvania
legislature pass statutes requiring that impost and excise searches be carried
out pursuant to specific warrants?18 3 Why also did four states act to restrict
the authority of federal officers to conduct general searches by requiring specific warrants as the mode of enforcement for a proposed federal impost
tax? 184 "If warrants, particularly specific warrants, were seen as the enemies
of privacy and liberty, and not as a restriction upon government power, these
s"185
actions by the states make little sense . .
Of course, this historical evidence does not clearly illuminate the thinking
of either James Madison-author of the Bill of Rights-or the other delegates
to the Constitutional Convention. The vast complexity of history does not
always permit a clear understanding of events and individuals of two hundred
years ago. 8 6 Nevertheless, this data does shed some light on the Fourth
statutory, and of predominantly Antifederalist authorship, it reflected a nation-wide
consensus. Antifederalists were in the minority, but no author challenged the contention of the six Antifederalists and one Federalist who had argued that such searches
were fundamentally repugnant. The Continental Congress had placed the nation on
record against general searches without warrant as early as 1774. The essays of
1787-88 did no more than reinforce that position.

Id. at 1499-1501 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
179 See supra notes 104-15 and accompanying text.

1so See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
181 See Cuddihy,

supra note 8, at 1291.
18 See id. at 1292-93 (discussing the Rhode Island Impost Act of 1785, Delaware's
Shipwrecked Cargoes Act of 1786, and a 1781 New Jersey statute that prohibited trading
with the enemy).
183 See id. at 1315-16.

18 See id. at 1347-51 (discussing state reaction to a proposal for a federal impost tax).
185 Cloud, supra note 15, at 1731.
186 See Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1486 ("The Fourth Amendment incorporated a legacy
of centuries, not decades, and can only be understood in the fullness of that legacy.").
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Amendment's purpose. History is relevant not because it offers irrefutable
answers to current constitutional questions, but because it provides guidance
187
on the broad values that underlie the Constitution's text.
Rather than evaluate the warrant preference rule solely through the
Amendment's cryptic text, or make the rule depend on whether historical records reveal an unequivocal statement indicating that "warrants are preferred," the rule should be linked to a value embodied in both text and history: control of police power.1 88 Viewed with this purpose in mind,
eighteenth century legislation requiring specific warrants confirms the
soundness of the warrant preference rule. Many politicians and judges of the
Framers' era grappled long with the problem of unreasonable search and seizure and came to prefer specific warrants to the promiscuous, discretionary
intrusions prevalent before the ratification of the Fourth Amendment. 189
Although a few individuals valued their privacy so strongly that they
"wanted no searches of private houses at all,"19° this view was neither widespread nor practical. Conversely, the states frequently breached the promise
contained in their constitutions to refrain from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The mass arrests and general searches of Quaker citizens in the
autumn of 1777,191 as well as the use of slave patrols in the Carolinas and
Georgia, 192 provide two notable examples. Legislatures normally pass laws
in the anticipation that constituents will comply with them. However, occasions will arise when search and seizure is necessary. The key question,
Interestingly, Amar offers no statement from James Madison indicating Madison's belief
that the Wilkes case "was the paradigm search and seizure case for Americans." Amar,
Fourth Amendment, supra note 16, at 772.
187 See Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REv. 555, 625 (1996) ("When the
background purposes and underlying values for a portion of the Constitution can be discerned, these purposes and values should drive the interpretation of the text.").
188 See Amsterdam, supra note 12, at 371 ("[T]he fourth amendment is quintessentially
a regulation of the police ... in enforcing the fourth amendment, courts must police the
police ....").
189

See Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1067 (noting that the supreme courts of Connecticut

and Pennsylvania were prepared to grant American customs officials writs of assistance,
but insisted that the writs be fashioned as specific warrants); id. at 1081 ("The Pennsylvania and Connecticut benches adhered to the special warrant as a replacement for the gen-

eral writ of assistance.").
19o
Id. at 1135. In Massachusetts, some citizens went beyond the legal position urged
by James Otis, Jr. and other opponents of general warrants and writs of assistance by
"opposing entrances of personal houses unconditionally, not just general searches and warrants as vehicles of entrance." Id.
191 See

id. at 1267-70 (discussing the searches to which members of the pacifist Quaker
sect were subjected during the revolutionary period).
192See id. at 1280-82 (discussing the searches conducted by slave patrols, which often

involved door-to-door searches of the homes of free blacks without warrant or suspicion).
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both then and now, is not whether searches and seizures will occur, but how
best to regulate them without jeopardizing the people's right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure.
By the time of the Fourth Amendment's ratification, general agreement
existed regarding the outlines of the right it secured.1 93 The Amendment's
text describes this consensus in part, but fails to explicate the full measure
and meaning of the right. Although the Amendment identifies warrants for
particular scrutiny, this was because other forms of search and seizure "had
never occasioned the intensity or depth of thought, adjudication, and legislation that search warrants had. " 194 The Amendment's text grants a right
against unreasonable intrusion. Experience and logic indicate that the Framers were concerned about the substance of the right, and not the methods
employed to violate it.195 Interpreting the text this way is consistent with the
historical fact that judges and politicians of the Framers' era chose specific
warrants as the antidote to the promiscuous intrusions sanctioned by the writs
of assistance or the search ex officio. One can thus see a solid foundation,
based on text and history, that supports the warrant preference rule and answers the question posed by Professor Amar regarding its historical origins.
IV. THE CONCEPT OF PROBABLE CAUSE: CONFINED TO WARRANTS OR A
CHECK ON ALL TYPES OF GOVERNMENT INTRUSION?

The Fourth Amendment states that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation .... "196 This probable
cause requirement serves to restrain law enforcement officers from invading
individual privacy and personal security. Under the probable cause rule, p0193 See id. at 1485-86. Cuddihy writes:

A broad consensus existed on the meaning of "unreasonable searches and seizures" when the Bill of Rights emerged. The unreasonableness of general warrants,
mass arrests, and promiscuous searches without warrant was widely conceded, as was
the reasonableness of specific warrants, of probable cause, and of much more. Although the precise contents of what became the amendment emerged only in the decade before its ratification, its rough contours had long been evident. The Fourth
Amendment incorporated a legacy of centuries, not decades, and can only be under-

stood in the fullness of that legacy.
Id. (footnote omitted).
194 Id. at 1558.

195 See id. at 1545. Cuddihy writes:
The most significant element of the amendment was not the identification of unreasonable categories of search and seizure but the generic concept of which those
categories were parts. The amendment's first clause, which explicitly renounces all
unreasonable searches and seizures, overshadows the second clause, which implicitly
renounced only a single category, the general warrant. The framers of the amend-

ment were less concerned with a right against general warrants than with the broader
rights those warrants infringed.

Id.
196 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
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lice cannot conduct a warrantless search or seizure unless they have sufficient facts to believe that a crime has occurred. Like the warrant preference
rule, the probable cause requirement controls police discretion and power.
Professor Amar is no fan of the probable cause rule. He insists that it
"stands the Fourth Amendment on its head." 1 97 For Amar, the procedural
safeguards embodied in the Warrant Clause-including probable cause-are
"necessary features of warrants," but do not apply to warrantless intrusions. 198 He asserts that history sustains his judgment:
History strongly supports this textual and structural analysis. No
leading framer or founding era commentator ... ever proclaimed that
every search or seizure required probable cause. On the contrary, the
First Congress clearly authorized various suspicionless searches of ships
and liquor storehouses; and we have already noted the common law rule
allowing an officer without ex ante probable cause to justify an arrest if
he played a mere subjective hunch and turned up an actual felon. 199
197 Amar,

FourthAmendment, supra note 16, at 782.

198 Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19,

at 63-64 ("Particular description, oath or

affirmation, and so on are necessary features of warrants, but not of all searches and seizures. So too with probable cause. Indeed, to limit warrants, we must insist that a certain
kind of probable cause exists, as well as a certain level of probability.").
199Id. at 64. In his earlier article, Professor Amar states: "The 'probable cause' standard applies only to 'warrants,' not to all 'searches and seizures.'" Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 16, at 782. But he also asserts: "Of course, certain intrusive subcategories of warrantless action-arrest, for example,-might generally require 'probable cause'
at common law, but this is a far cry from the idea that all searches and seizures must meet
this standard to be reasonable." Id. One could say that Professor Amar is trying to have it
both ways.
If the 'probable cause' standard applies only to 'warrants,' then a warrantless arrest
need not be supported by probable cause. Perhaps Amar is not convinced that arrests require probable cause. He seems to hedge on this point when he writes that an arrest
"might generally require 'probable cause' at common law . . . ." Id. Of course, the crucial issue is not whether the common law required probable cause for an arrest, but what
the Fourth Amendment requires. Because even a routine arrest is quite intrusive, I believe
that the Amendment requires both probable cause and a warrant to validate such an intrusion. But cf. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). Although Justice Powell
concluded that routine arrests did require probable cause, but not a warrant, he succinctly
stated the argument justifying both:
Since the Fourth Amendment speaks equally to both searches and seizures, and since
an arrest, taking hold of one's person, is quintessentially a seizure, it would seem that
the constitutional provision should impose the same limitations upon arrest that it does
upon searches. Indeed, as an abstract matter an argument can be made that the restrictions upon arrest perhaps should be greater .... An arrest... is a serious personal intrusion regardless of whether the person seized is guilty or innocent ....
[N]o [judicial] decision that he should go free can come quickly enough to erase the
invasion of his privacy that already will have occurred.
Id. at 428 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Before replying to Amar's claim that "[n]o leading framer or founding era
commentator" ever articulated a probable cause requirement, I want to discuss why Amar's theory that the principle of probable cause is textually confined to the issuance of warrants is flawed. It is wrong because the concept
of probable cause predates the use of specific warrants.
The first American example of the specific warrant demanded by the Warrant Clause surfaced in a colonial law book in 1749; 2W general warrants, as
we understand them today, developed in the fifteenth century; 201 and Michael
Dalton's The Countrey Justice provided the first prototype for a general
search warrant as early as 1618. 202 But the concept of probable cause predates each of these events, materializing by at least the early 1300s:
By an act of Edward I in 1275, one of the earliest precedents for probable cause, no person or community could be fined "without reasonable
cause and according to the quality of his trespass." Similar holdings in
criminal case law followed, for, in 1326, the King's Bench ruled that
the cause for which Henry of Wellingborough had been arrested
"seems ...

insufficient."

Forty years later, a Yorkshire sheriff ar-

rested a gang of reputed highway robbers even though fourteen inquests
had refused to return indictments against them. In Ughtred et al. v.
Musgrave (1366), however, the king's council replied that the arrests
were unjustifiable "by the law of the land," for they had been predicated on "common cry and scandal. "203
Although Professor Amar suggests that probable cause is a necessary feature of warrants, history teaches that this concept existed long before the
creation of either general or specific warrants as instruments of search and
seizure. Moreover, Amar implies that the Framers did not believe that war-

200 See Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 347.
201 See id. at 82 (noting the general searches for vagrants pursuant to a 1487 proclamation of Henry VII); id. at 89 (discussing Henry VII's proclamation authorizing general
searches for counterfeiters).
202

See id. at 95.

203 Id. at 853-54 (footnotes omitted); see also Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and
Common Sense: A Reply to the Criticsof Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465,
479 (1984) (noting that the early common law did not require a high level of suspicion for
arrest; a 1285 statute required town guards to arrest strangers after sunset and to detain
them further if there existed "cause of suspicion"); Jack K. Weber, The Birth of Probable
Cause, 11 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 155, 156-57 (1982) (tracing the origins of probable cause
back to cases of false arrest arising as early as the year 1244); cf. BARBARA SHAPIRO,
BEYOND "REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE": HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw OF EVIDENCE 47 (1991) (noting that by 1222, "presentment

juries functioned primarily to report persons about whom there was 'suspicion'"); id. at
127 (noting the "suggest[ion] that by the fourteenth century there had developed a notion
of adequate and inadequate grounds for arrest and a procedure for suits for false arrest").
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rantless intrusions required probable cause.2°4 In this he overlooks the two
widely publicized seizures of the ships Active and Liberty, which occurred
within ten years of the Revolution. 2 5 Because the widely voiced complaint
of many colonists was that these warrantless seizures occurred without adequate cause, the probable cause principle was thus injected "into the American legal vocabulary as a nebulous understanding that property could not be
2
seized without substantial reason." °6
The colonists began to focus on the probable cause requirement when
British searches of their ships began to threaten not only their privacy, but
also their economic livelihoods. Section 46 of the Sugar Act of 1764 barred
shipowners from suing customs officers who seized their vessels if a judge
retrospectively found probable cause justified the seizure. 2°7 Thus, an officer
was immune "if a judge decided that the circumstances of the seizure had
suggested smuggling even though no smuggling had occurred or been
proven. Even if the shipowner had incurred ruinous financial damages and
had proved his innocence decisively, a certification of probable cause precluded his suit. "208 Around the same time that section 46 was starting to
have an impact, Britain began deputizing personnel of the Royal Navy as
customs officers. 2°9 The confluence of these two events helped to focus colonial thinking on the principle of probable cause.
Within the span of a year, navy personnel and customs agents seized ships
belonging to Henry Laurens of South Carolina and John Hancock of Massachusetts, two wealthy and influential colonial merchants. 210 In Laurens's
case, "the Admiralty Court of South Carolina used the decree of probable
cause to shield customs officers from accountability for seizures that they had
accomplished without sound reason."211 In Boston, John Hancock was able
to enlist the help of the Boston Town Meeting, which, in a report authored
by James Otis, Jr. and John Adams, complained that customs officers confis204 See Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 64 ("No leading framer or found-

ing era commentator, so far as I have seen, ever proclaimed that every search or seizure

required probable cause.").
205 See Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1206-11 & n.54 (stating that the Active was seized in
1767 for not observing certain formalities of departure that the law required, and the Liberty was seized in 1768 for suspected smuggling, although the grounds of seizure were
"shaky").
206 Id. at 1214.
207 See id. at 1200.
208 Id. at 1200-01.
29

See id. at 1201.

210

For a description of the procedures and trials involving Laurens's and Hancock's

ships, see Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1205-14. See also THOMAS BARROW, TRADE AND
EMPIRE 206-10, 229-35, 238 (1967); OLIVER M. DICKERSON, THE NAVIGATION ACTS AND
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 224-49 (1951); CARL UBBELOHDE, THE VICE-ADMIRALTY
COURTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
211 Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1206.

101-27 (1960).
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cated Hancock's sloop, the Liberty, without probable cause. 212 Both Laurens
and Hancock organized loud and effective political protests over the wrongful seizure of their vessels. 2 13 "The statements on probable cause, by Laurens in the Active case and by the Boston town meeting 21
on4 the Liberty, saturated newspapers from Rhode Island to South Carolina."
Professor Amar ignores the controversies involving Laurens and Hancock.
He also points to congressional approval of suspicionless intrusions as undermining the historical pedigree of the probable cause rule. In criticizing
the probable cause rule, however, Amar draws an incomplete picture of the
actions of the First Congress. Referring to the Collection Act of 1789, Amar
says "the First Congress clearly authorized various suspicionless searches of
ships and liquor storehouses . . . . "215 The Collection Act, however, also
permitted two other different types of searches, both of which undermine
Amar's argument that Congress authorized suspicionless searches of ships.
The first type of search, authorized by section 15 of the Collection Act of
1789, was a regulatory inspection, which required neither a warrant nor any
suspicion. This search did not require any suspicion because the searchtriggering event "was simply the arrival of a ship in a port."216 Section 24 of
the Act, however, permitted a second type of search when customs officers
had "reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject to duty
[were] concealed" on any ship. 217 The third type of search permitted by the
Collection Act concerned searches of buildings. As noted above, this third
category of search permitted a search of private premises when officers had
"cause to suspect" taxable goods were concealed inside, but Congress decreed that a specific warrant was necessary before a search could proceed. 21 8
Professor Amar is thus only half right: the First Congress authorized suspicionless searches in one context, but in others it required customs officers
to have "reason to suspect" a violation of the Act before conducting a warrantless search. 219 Amar, however, writes that arguments in defense of the

214

See id. at 1210-12.
See id. at 1205-14.
Id. at 1213.

215

Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 64.

216

Cloud, supra note 15, at 1740.

212
213

Collection Act of 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (emphasis added); see also Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1488 ("The Collection law exposed every ship to a warrantless
search on reasonable suspicion that it concealed taxable property.").
21 See Collection Act, § 24, 1 Stat. at 43; see also supra notes 162-65 and accompany
217

text.
219 Congress repealed the Collection Act of 1789 the following year, but the 1790 suc-

cessor statute "imposed similar restrictions on suspicion-based searches and seizures on
land as well as upon vessels." Cloud, supra note 15, at 1742. A subsequent 1799 law

followed a similar pattern concerning searches of vessels and buildings. See id. Professor
Morgan Cloud has meticulously detailed the different types of search and seizure provi-
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probable cause rule lack historical and textual support; he states that defenders of the rule fail "to show where this rule or preference comes from as a
constitutional principle," and offer "no explicit framing statement" supporting the rule. 220
If Professor Amar wants an "explicit framing statement" on the necessity
of probable cause as a precondition for a warrantless seizure, he should consider the statement contained in the Boston Town Meeting report of June 17,
1768, concerning the seizure of John Hancock's sloop, the Liberty, seized
without "any probable cause of seizure that we know of."221 If Professor
Amar wants an explanation for where the probable cause rule "comes from
as a constitutional principle," he should more closely examine the Fourth
Amendment's history.
Although not every supporter of the right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure spoke against warrantless searches, 222 Professor Amar ignores a large segment of history when he writes that "[h]istory strongly supports" 223 his view that "warrantless searches need not always have probable
cause, so long as they are reasonable."224 During the period in which the
Constitution was proposed and adopted, there were many who believed that
warrantless searches and seizures conducted without probable cause were unreasonable. 225 Designed to bar indiscriminate and subjective intrusions, today's probable cause rule reflects this belief. As Professor Cloud has stated:
"A significant part of the historical record ... is consistent with logic: the
Framers acted to eliminate search and seizure methods that permitted the arbitrary exercise of discretion and were conducted without good cause,
sions contained in these laws and concluded that "these statutes did permit warrantless
searches, but they also imposed limits on suspicion-based intrusions consistent with the
conjunctive theory of the Amendment." Id. Thus, the criteria of the Warrant Clause define the procedural qualities of reasonable warrantless intrusion.
220 Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 74-75.
221 Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1210. Although this statement may not impress Professor
Amar, this protest and a similar one by Henry Laurens attracted the attention of colonial
newspapers up and down the Atlantic Coast. See id. at 1213 n.58 (listing colonial era

newspaper stories on the Liberty and the Active). For the impact of these seizures on colonial politics toward England, see BARROW, supra note 210, at 234 ("Indirectly Hancock
and his ship, the Liberty, had commenced a series of events leading to open revolution.");
id. at 235 ("The publicity given to [the Laurens] affair served to crystallize public opinion
and to furnish such propagandists as Sam Adams with effective arguments for a united
front against the incursions of imperial authority.").
222 Some "Antifederalist 'minorities' at the Pennsylvania and Maryland conventions
wanted a simple abolition of general warrants and mentioned no broader right." Cuddihy,

supra note 8, at 1471.
23

Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 64.

224 Id. at 63.

See supra note 178 (discussing Framing-era statements of those opposed to general,
suspicionless searches).
225
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whether or not warrants were employed."226 While the text of the Amendment places the principle of probable cause within the Warrant Clause, applying this principle to warrantless intrusions strengthens Fourth Amendment
values and promotes the purpose of the Amendment, which is to check discretionary police power. The Framers would have supported this logic. 227
V.

THE REASONABLENESS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The text of the Fourth Amendment looms very large in Professor Amar's
theories on the Amendment. 228 He believes the text defines the meaning and
226 Cloud, supra note 15, at 1729 (emphasis added); see also Cuddihy, supra note 8, at
1529 (stating that "[a]lthough the language of the amendment equates probable cause with
warrants, it absorbed practices that required such cause for warrantless procedures").
227 See Cloud, supra note 15, at 1729 ("There is no logical reason to think that the
Founders only wanted to eliminate the evils of suspicionless and arbitrary intrusions when
searchers used warrants.").
2u Professor Amar devotes considerable attention to rejecting what he characterizes as a
.widespread canard" regarding the ultimate wording of the Fourth Amendment. Amar,
Fourth Amendment, supra note 16, at 775 n.66. He writes that those scholars who contend that "the ultimate wording of the Fourth Amendment need not be taken seriously, because it was a result of happenstance, not careful consideration," promote a false and
baseless version of the Amendment and the Constitution. Id. Professor Amar has twice
placed me in the camp of such scholars. See id.; see also Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 67 n.54. Most recently, he wrote that I tried "to downplay the status of
the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment by arguing that 'undisputed history'
shows that the Amendment's final wording was due to 'a single congressman' who rewrote
the Amendment in a last-minute style committee and slipped his rewrite past an unwary
House." Id.
First of all, I never tried "to downplay the status" of the Reasonableness Clause. In
fact, I have always argued that "the broad principle embodied in the Reasonableness
Clause is that discretionary police power implicating Fourth Amendment interests cannot
be trusted." Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 197, 229 (1993).
Second, as to the Amendment's phraseology, I have cautioned against a literal interpretation of the text to ascertain the Framers' "original intent" because "there is good reason
to believe that the precise language of the Fourth Amendment was not particularly important to the founding fathers." Id. at 208. In support of this argument, I cited Nelson Lasson's description of how Congressman Egbert Benson, Chairman of a Committee of Three
to arrange the Amendments, altered the language of an agreed upon provision and submitted a different version of the Amendment to the House of Representatives. See id. at 208
n.35; see also LASSON, supra note 121, at 101-03.
Cuddihy's study of the Fourth Amendment confirms my general point that the background events contributing to the Amendment's phraseology are a poor source for determining "original intent," just as the literal text of the Amendment does not provide clear
meaning regarding the Framers' intentions. For example, how much significance should
be attributed to the fact that the House of Representatives unanimously approved a version
of the Amendment that eliminated the phrase "unreasonable searches and seizures"? See
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purpose of the Amendment: the Amendment "simply requires that each and
every search or seizure be reasonable."2 9 Amar insists that the history of
the Fourth Amendment supports his view that the "core of the Fourth
Amendment... is neither a warrant nor probable cause, but reasonableness. "230
Professor Amar relies on Article XIV of the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, the Bay State equivalent of the Fourth Amendment, in support of his
vision of the Fourth Amendment. Article XIV provides:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches,
and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or
foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation;
and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize
their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the
persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure: and no warrant ought to
be issued but in cases, and with the formalities, prescribed by the
1
laws.

23

Professor Amar states that "[t]he language, logic and structure of ...Ar-

Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1408-09. I think that even Professor Amar would dismiss the
significance of this fact when interpreting the Amendment, even though it indicates that the
House wanted the phrase "unreasonable searches and seizures" stripped from the text.
Like the legislation proposed by the First Congress, congressional actions during the
drafting of the Amendment raise many questions but provide few answers to the Amendment's meaning:
The records of the 1780's... are only a point of departure, for they identified only
the amendment's components without saying how they fit together, where they came
from, why, by who, and how they were assembled, or how the mechanism they comprise was intended to operate. The components have different histories and acquired
legal force at different times and from different sources.
Id. at ciii; see also id. at 1477-78 ("Inadequacies in the documentary record preclude a
comprehensive reconstruction of the stages in the amendment's development."). The textual prohibition of "unreasonable" searches and seizures also provides no meaningful assistance in determining the Framers' intent. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist
Coherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1205 (1987)
(noting that the "due process clauses, the equal protection clause, the fourth amendment's
prohibition of 'unreasonable' searches and seizures, and the eighth amendment's guarantee
against 'cruel and unusual punishments"' are phrases that "constitutionalize particular concepts or values[,] ...[b]ut those values or concepts are, in the idiom of ordinary language
philosophy, 'essentially contestable'" (footnotes omitted)).
229 Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 55.
230 Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 16, at 801.
231 MAss. CONST. OF 1780 pt. I, art. XIV, reprintedin RONALD M. PETERS, JR., THE
MASSACHUSETrS CONSTrUTION OF 1780: A SOCIAL COMPACT app. 195, 199 (1974).
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ticle XIV rather clearly foreshadow the federal Fourth Amendment. "232 He
contends that "the clear tone of the Article seems skeptical towards warrants."233 Why is this so? Because, according to Amar, "[t]he first clause of
Article XIV affirms a right to be secure against unreasonable intrusions, and
later clauses seek to limit warrants, not require or prefer them."234
It is true that the first clause of Article XIV affirms a right to be secure
from unreasonable intrusions; however, subsequent clauses merely restrict
certain types of warrants, not all warrants. In other words, Article XIV announces that warrants that lack a proper foundation and fail to particularly
identify the target of the intrusion "are contrary" to the substantive right affirmed in the first clause. 235 In requiring specificity in warrants, Article XIV
does not condemn warrants as Amar assumes.
Professor Amar then goes on to write:
The pivotal word "therefore" logically linking the two halves of Article
XIV rather clearly says that overbroad warrants-not warrantless
searches-are per se unreasonable. Nowhere is there a third clause in
Article XIV requiring warrants for all searches and seizures, and the
clear tone of the Article seems skeptical towards warrants ....
War236
rants here are heavies, not heroes.
Article XIV does condemn overbroad warrants as contrary to the right to be
secure against unreasonable intrusion, and Article XIV contains no clause
requiring warrants for all searches and seizures. But what conclusions
should be drawn from the text about warrantless intrusions? Professor Amar
declares that this means warrantless intrusions are not unreasonable per se.
One could conclude that Article XIV expresses no preference regarding
the reasonableness of warrantless intrusions, but in fact, the best reading of
Article XIV is that it remains silent on whether warrantless intrusions "are
contrary" to the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
More to the point, nothing in the text provides any hint that the "clear tone
of Article XIV seems skeptical towards warrants," as Amar positively concludes. The only "clear tone" that Article XIV voices is one of skepticism
232 Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 67.
Id.
234 Id.
233

235

Interestingly, Article XIV does not "extend mandatory particularization to places,

for it required that warrants designate only 'the person or objects of search, arrest or seizure,' and said nothing about designating houses or other structures." Cuddihy, supra
note 8, at 1244 n. 15. According to Cuddihy, this omission was not significant:
In contemporary Massachusetts, the specification of places to be searched had been
the focus of the developing right against search and seizure for a century, since Edward Randolph's time. The insistence of James Otis, in 1761, that search warrants
were illegal unless they restricted the search to particular places reflected local law.
Id.
236 Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 67.
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toward overbroad warrants. Article XIV leaves unstated any skepticism or
preference toward specific warrants-until the final clause.
The final clause, which Professor Amar does not discuss, provides that
"no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities, prescribed by the laws."237 What does this mean? The text itself suggests that
warrants are valid if they satisfy the formalities of state law. Since the 1750s,
Massachusetts law favored the specific warrant as the means for conducting
search and seizure operations. By the time the 1780 constitution was writ238
ten, Massachusetts had firmly established a tradition of specific warrants,
a tradition that continued long after the adoption of Article XIV.
The historical backdrop against which the final clause of Article XIV must
be interpreted shows that specific warrants play a vital role in protecting the
right affirmed in the first clause of the Article. Indeed, if Article XIV has
any clarity of tone, it is not, as Amar would have, one that expresses skepticism toward warrants. On the contrary, when Article XIV was proposed and
ratified, state law had already turned to the specific warrant as the primary
method of search and seizure. Article XIV expressly referenced that law
when describing the types of warrants that ought to issue. Thus, the tone of
Article XIV's text only expresses a rejection of overbroad warrants.
A further aspect of Article XIV's origins makes it impossible to accept
Professor Amar's interpretation of the text. Amar acknowledges that John
Adams was an admirer of James Otis, Jr., and explains that Adams's later
writings were crucial in documenting Otis's argument and involvement in the
writs of assistance controversy. 239 Professor Amar does not, however, discuss what Otis had to say and, significantly, omits to inform his readers that
2
John Adams wrote the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution. =
In his argument against the writs of assistance, Otis did not condemn all
warrants. He stated that special or specific warrants were reasonable. Otis
told the Superior Court that special warrants or writs "of one kind, may be
237

MASS. CONST. OF 1780 pt. I, art. XIV, reprinted in RONALD M. PETERS, JR., THE

OF 1780: A SOCIAL COMPAcT app. 195, 199 (1974).
See Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1291 (noting that after the mid-eighteenth century,
"the only warrants that Massachusetts law created were specific ones of the type that its
excise and impost taxes had introduced in 1756-57"); see also supra Part H.B (describing

MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION
238

Massachusetts's transformation to specific warrants). Among the states that had a written
constitution before 1784, Massachusetts was the only one to submit it to the voters for approval. See Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1245. The citizens of Stoughton approved the 1780
constitution and voiced no opposition to Article XIV. See id. at 1248. Nonetheless, "all
85 of the town's voters considered [Article XIV's] language [and in particular the last
clause] imprecise enough to be tightened, . . . [they also] wanted the constitution to iden-

tify Massachusetts as the source of those laws." Id.
239 See Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 76; see also supra notes 118-39
and accompanying text (discussing the writs of assistance controversy).
240 See generally Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19. See also Cuddihy, supra
note 8, at 1240 (noting the authorship of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780).
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legal, that is, special writs, directed to special officers, and to search certain
houses .... especially set forth in the writ." 24 1 These statements on special
warrants reflected not only "a shrewd appreciation of certain important realities," 24 2 but also the prevailing doctrine of search and seizure law in Massachusetts. 24 3 In addition, Otis argued that writs of assistance granted "a
power that places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer."2 4 With a writ of assistance, customs officers "may enter our house
when they please-we are commanded to permit their entry-their menial
servants may enter-may break locks, bars and every thing in their way-and
whether they break through malice or revenge, no man, no court can inquire-bare suspicion without oath is sufficient."245 In essence, Otis articulated a prescient search and seizure doctrine, deprecating the general search
and arguing in favor of the specific warrant as its replacement.
Otis's statements do not provide conclusive proof that warrantless intrusions are unreasonable per se under Article XIV. They do, however, offer
insight into the thinking of both Otis and John Adams, the author of Article
XIV and the person most responsible for sustaining the memory of Otis and
his writs of assistance speech as the "lustrous centerpiece of the events of
1760-61."246 Otis's legal argument instructs that a promiscuous intrusion,
with or without warrant, is unreasonable because it allows officers to search
and seize at their discretion. His statements emphasize the reasonableness of
special warrants that confine the discretionary power of officers. In 1780, a
man so taken with Otis's speech that he later wrote that "Otis's oration
against the writs of assistance breathed into this nation the breath of life,"247

241

SMITH,

supra note 97, at 331; see also id. at 368 (noting Otis's argument that

"special writs may be granted on oath and probable suspicion," and that a "magistrate, if
he thinks proper should issue a special warrant to a constable to search the places").
242 Id. at 332.

243 See Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 792 (noting that Otis and his allies did not initiate the
hostility toward general warrants in the Bay Colony, but only "announced the conclusion,

the specific warrant, that [hostility to general warrants] implied").
244 SMITH, supra note 97, at 342.
245 Id. at 344.
246 Id. at 507.
247 Letter from John Adams to H. Niles (Jan. 14, 1818), in 10 CHARLES FRANCIS
ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 276 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1856). John Adams was a young lawyer when Otis delivered his argument in the writs of assistance case.

Adams later wrote that:
Otis was a flame of fire! ...Every man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go

away, as I did, ready to take arms against writs of assistance. Then and there was the
first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then
and there the child Independence was born. In fifteen years, namely in 1776, he
grew up to manhood, and declared himself free.
Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (Mar. 29, 1817), in 10 ADAMS, supra, at 24748.
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authored the state constitution that condemned the overbroad warrant and
linked the validity of future warrants to the same laws that required specific
warrants for various types of searches and seizures.
Seen in this context, Otis's attack on writs of assistance casts substantial
doubt on Professor Amar's insistence that "the clear tone of Article XIV
seems skeptical toward warrants."248 If anything, Article XIV indicates a
skepticism toward overbroad warrants and warrantless promiscuous intrusions that manifest the same characteristics as general warrants. This conclusion is not based on a literal reading of the text, identification of textual tone,
or cursory historical analysis. 249 Rather, it rests on textual and historical
consideration of the generic right secured by Article XIV's first clause, as
well as identification of the value and purpose of that right.
In sum, I cannot accept Amar's conclusion that both Article XIV and the
federal Fourth Amendment sought to limit warrants. Although both Article
XIV and the Fourth Amendment condemn overbroad warrants, "the language, logic and structure" 250 of both provisions do not compel Amar's
judgment that warrants "were friends of the officer, not the citizen."251 The
248 Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 67.
249 Professor Amar relies on a Massachusetts case, decided in 1851, to support his
proposition that "warrants were not preferred." Id. at 70 (citing Rohan v. Sawin, 59
Mass. (5 Cush.) 281 (1851)). Although it is true that this case involved a warrantless arrest, the Supreme Judicial Court noted that if the arresting officer had "probable and reasonable grounds for believing the party guilty of a felony[,]" he would be justified in
making the arrest. Rohan, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 285.
Amar also enlists Jones v. Root, an 1856 conversion case in support of his cause. See
Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 70 (citing Jones v. Root, 72 Mass. (6 Gray)
435 (1856)). In Jones, however, the defendant seized the plaintiffs property pursuant to a
statute authorizing town officials to make a warrantless arrest of any person "whom they
may find in the act of illegally selling, transporting or distributing intoxicating liquors .... ." Jones, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) at 435 (emphasis added) (quoting 1855 Mass. Acts
ch. 215, § 13).
Amar cites a third case, Robinson v. Richardson, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 454 (1859), in
support of the argument that Article XIV was designed to "limit, restrain and regulate"
warrants. Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 70-71 (quoting Robinson, 79
Mass. (13 Gray) at 457). This case was a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to
compel a judge to issue a warrant as required by a Massachusetts insolvency statute. See
Robinson, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) at 454. The Supreme Judicial Court, however, held the
Act unconstitutional on the basis that "[s]earch warrants were never recognized by the
common law as processes which might be availed of by individuals in the course of civil
proceedings, or for the maintenance of any mere private right." Id. at 456. The case does
not discuss warrantless search or arrest. See generally Robinson, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 454.
Finally, it is difficult to understand how these three cases, decided more than seventy
years after the ratification of the Massachusetts constitution, throw any light upon the
Framers' intent.
250 Amar, Writs of Assistance, supra note 19, at 67.
251Id. at 60.
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purpose of Article XIV was to restrain the discretion of officers and executive officials. With this in mind, one can read Article XIV and properly
conclude that promiscuous warrantless intrusions exhibiting the same traits as
general warrants also violate the principle embodied in Article XIV.
Putting Article XIV aside, other historical evidence proves wrong Professor Amar's judgment that the Fourth Amendment "simply requires that each
and every search or seizure be reasonable. "252 Amar's flexible standard of
reasonableness does not acknowledge the Framers' very definite ideas about
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures that were not
expressed in the Amendment's text. Consider the issue of nocturnal searches.
The Fourth Amendment contains no restriction on when warrants can be
executed, and none of the early state constitutions address the issue. 253 Prior
to the 1750s, the typical impost law of the northern and central colonies
authorized nocturnal searches of houses. 254 Elsewhere, nocturnal searches
were considered unexceptional and were permitted for enforcement of laws
addressing such diverse subjects as deer preservation, the Indian trade, and
slave patrols. 255 The colonists' views as to the reasonableness of nocturnal
entries was, however, undergoing a gradual change so that by the 1780s
every state except Delaware had enacted a statute barring nocturnal
searches. 256 Even the states that still authorized general warrants barred
nighttime searches. The First Congress included in the Collection and Ex257
cise Acts provisions limiting all searches of buildings to daytime hours.
Unannounced entry provides another example of a type of intrusion condemned as unreasonable at the time of the framing, but left unaddressed in
the text of the Fourth Amendment. The common law required an officer to
announce his authority and purpose before breaking open the doors of a
home. 258 This developed into an established American tradition known as
the "knock and announce" rule. 5 9 "The statutes and legal manuals of at
Id. at 55.
"[S]even different states had constitutional provisions which were to serve as precedents for the Fourth Amendment." LASSON, supra note 121, at 82. These included
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and
Virginia. See id. at 82 n. 17. None of the state constitutions indicated any temporal restrictions regarding searches and seizures. See 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 256-344 (1971) (reproducing the early state constitutions).
254 See Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 865-66.
252
25

255

Id. at 866 & n.119.

See id. at 1346 & n.228.
See id. at 1511.
258 See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-36 (1995).
259 See id. (discussing the historical pedigree of the knock and announce rule). See generally Robert G. Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United
States and Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 499 (1964); Robert J. Driscoll, Unannounced Police Entries and Destruction of Evidence After Wilson v. Arkansas, 29 COLUM.
256
257
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least seven states permitted forcible entry only after a householder had refused to admit a searcher under circumstances that included smuggling,
counterfeiting, and trading with the enemy." 26° Congress followed this tradition in the Excise Act of 1791 by permitting warrantless searches of registered buildings only "upon request" of the inspecting officer. 261
The knock and announce rule and the prohibition on nocturnal searches
provide two examples of official intrusion widely prohibited as unreasonable
at the time the Fourth Amendment was proposed but not addressed by its
text. 262 Both demonstrate that the "original meaning" of the Fourth Amendment cannot be deduced by simply looking at its text and pronouncing a rule
of "reasonableness": "The history that preceded the Fourth Amendment...
reveals a depth and complexity that transcend language. To think of the
amendment as a right against general warrants disparages its intricacy. The
amendment expressed not a single idea but a family of ideas whose identity
and dimensions developed in historical context."263
CONCLUSION

The right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure owes much to
history. The specific warrant mandated by the Warrant Clause evolved over
centuries of legal thought and practice. But while history imbues the Fourth
Amendment with meaning, the evolutionary process that produced the
Amendment also brought about the renunciation of historic precedent. 264 As
Cuddihy writes:
Between 1776 and 1787, the American law of search and seizure

J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1 (1995); Charles Patrick Garcia, Note, The Knock and Announce
Rule: A New Approach to the Destruction-of-Evidence Exception, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 685
(1993); Jennifer M. Goddard, Note, The Destruction of Evidence Exception to the Knock
and Announce Rule: A Callfor Protection of Fourth Amendment Rights, 75 B.U. L. REV.
449 (1995); Note, Announcements in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139 (1970).
260 Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1512.
261

262

Excise Act of 1791, ch. 15, § 29, 1 Stat. 199, 206.
An additional example is the multiple-specific warrant that identified the target or

object of a search or arrest, but authorized many persons or places to be subjected to official intrusion. During the Revolutionary War, several states utilized such warrants to ar-

rest dozens of persons and to carry out wide-ranging searches for contraband. See Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1341-42; see also id. at 1495 ("Most states had standardized the
specific warrant by 1789, and nearly all of those states, in turn, limited search warrants to
single, not plural locations.").
263
264

Id. at 1555.
See LEVY, supra note 20, at 224 ("The Fourth Amendment would not emerge from

colonial precedents; rather, it would repudiate them; or, as Cuddihy states, 'The ideas
comprising the Fourth Amendment reversed rather than formalized colonial precedents.
Reasonable search and seizure in colonial America closely approximated whatever the

searcher thought reasonable.'" (citation omitted)).
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underwent a transformation that separated it from British law. The
most obvious mark of that transformation was the written constitutional
acknowledgment of a right respecting search and seizure by most of the
new states .... American law carried development of the right to new
heights by enacting various concepts of unreasonable search and seizure
that Englishmen had demanded but that English law had ignored. Although Britons had long advocated the specific warrant, Americans did
more to actualize it in five years, 1782-87, than Britain had in a century. 265

In the end, the history and text of the Amendment provide only helpful
markers for interpretation. Ultimately, the judiciary bears the responsibility
of expounding upon the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment. Professor Amar and I agree that the right against unreasonable search and seizure
guarantees more than procedural protections; we disagree, however, about
the substantive content of that right.
A vision that the text of the Constitution does not express pervades Professor Amar's theories on constitutional criminal procedure and the Fourth
Amendment. "Truth and the protection of innocence are [enduring] values.
Virtually everything in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, properly
read, promotes, or at least does not betray, these values."266 Sympathetic to
this vision, judges might look to Amar's writings to defend an interpretation
of the Fourth Amendment that establishes "[t]ruth and the protection of innocence" as the centerpiece of the Amendment. Such a result would be both
267
radical and ahistorical.
For some, the Fourth Amendment is not one of the "respectable" provisions of the Bill of Rights. 268 Judges may be tempted to "look the other
way" when formulating Fourth Amendment rules that hamper the discovery
Cuddihy, supra note 8, at 1357.
supra note 16, at 155; see also Amar, Fourth Amendment, supra note 16, at
759 (describing his Fourth Amendment package as "coherent and sensible... [and] less
destructive of the basic trial value of truth seeking-sorting the innocent from the guilty").
267 The colonists did not object to general warrants because only the innocent were being subjected to unreasonable searches: "[T]he British writs of assistance were aimed at
uncovering smugglers and collecting taxes. Everyone knew that smuggling was rampant,
and one objection to these broad searches was that they increased the chance of the hated
British collecting what were viewed as unfair taxes." Thomas, supra note 18, at
(forthcoming).
268 C.LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 19 (1983). Baker writes:
Americans have always been quick to defend what are considered the respectable
265

266 AMAR,

freedoms: press, religion, assembly. But those accused of crime have had few defenders. Few men have rushed to uphold the constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable search or seizure or against compelled self-incrimination when it was a
kilo of heroin that was seized or a confession forced from a father accused of bludgeoning his daughter to death.

Id.
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and apprehension of criminals. In spite of this temptation, judges should not
rely upon Professor Amar's judgments to narrow the substantive right that is
at the core of the Fourth Amendment. Amar's statements on the history of
the Amendment neglect several historic events that undermine his legal conclusions. He provides a facile interpretation of the Amendment's text, in
269
part the result of his refusal to acknowledge Cuddihy's work.
Professor Amar offers an enticing, but ultimately unfounded effort to reduce the Fourth Amendment to a bar against broad warrants and an exhortation to "reasonableness." Cuddihy explains why the Fourth Amendment
cannot be summarized in the manner proposed by Amar:
Historical inquiry resolves much of th[e amendment's] ambiguity and
suggests that the amendment did not enumerate specific categories of
search and seizure as unreasonable because its authors, in drafting it,
shared a general consensus on what those categories were. Legislation,
case law, legal treatises, pamphlets, newspapers, constitutional debates,
and correspondence in America during the 1780's condemned not only
the general warrant but also certain other methods of search and seizure
so consistently that their constitutional designation as unreasonable
270
would have been almost superfluous.
A critic of the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution once said
that for the "nonlawyer, the Fourth Amendment is the apple pie and the
Fourth of July of constitutional law, the Constitution's way of expressing the
deeply rooted American conviction that a man's home is his castle."27!
Whatever truth this statement may still hold is debatable; what is certain,
however, is that the history of the Fourth Amendment is vast, important to
modern-day analysis, and cannot be reduced to simplistic legal theory, however novel.

269

Professor Amar's historical scholarship on the Fourth Amendment falls into a cate-

gory that Professor Cloud aptly describes as "lawyers' histories":
[Ilt is important to recognize lawyers' histories for what they are, and for what they
are not. This kind of work is not constitutional history, it is not legal history; it is not
history. It is a lawyer's selective use of historical data to advance a legal argument.
It is part of a time-honored tradition in which most legal scholars who write about
constitutional history participate from time to time.
Cloud, supra note 15, at 1745 (footnote omitted).
270 Cuddihy, supra note 8, at ciii (footnote omitted).
271 FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 196 (1969).

